M. S. A. Siddiqui,j.

( 1 ) THIS appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code is directed against the order of the Additional District Judge, Delhi dated 30th September, 1996 in Civil Suit No. 168/96.

( 2 ) THE appellant/defendant invited tenders for execution of certain work and the respondent/plaintiff submitted the tender. The tender submitted by the respondent was accepted by the appellant and the letter of acceptance dated 13. 2. 1996 containing certain terms and conditions of the contract was conveyed to the respondent. Formal contract was executed on 29. 2. 1996. The appellant terminated the contract vide letter dated 13. 9. 96. Aggrieved by the said action, the respondent filed a suit for mandatory injunction against the appellant. Alongwith the plaint, the respondent also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 for an ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from terminating the contract. The learned trial court by the impugned order dated 30th September, 1996 after hearing the parties, granted an ad interim injunction as sought by the respondent. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant has now come up in appeal before this court.

LEARNED counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned order on the following grounds :- (a) That the contract in its nature was determinable and according to Section 14 (1) (c) of the Specific Relief Act (for short the Act ) such a contract cannot be specifically enforced, the plaintiff s suit for permanent injunction to prevent the breach of the contract is barred under Section 41 (e) of the Act; (b) That since a breach of the contract of this nature can always be compensated in money, the plaintiff s suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable.

( 3 ) AT the outset, I must make it clear that ordinarily it is not open to the appellate Court to substitute its own discretion for that of the Trial Court. But if it appears to the appellate court that in exercise of its discretion the Trial Court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored the relevant facts and has adopted an unjudicious approach then it would certainly open to the appellate court to interfere with the trial court s discretion. It is well settled that the granting of ad interim injunction is purely within the discretion of the Court but the discretion has to be exercised in accordance with the sound judicial principles. The principles which govern the exercise of the discretion are that the party claiming ad interim injunction should establish that it has a prima facie case; that interference by the court is necessary to protect it from an irreparable injury and that the balance of convenience is in its favour. It has also to be borne in mind that the general principles governing the grant of ad interim injunction and those governing the grant of perpetual injunctions are similar.

( 4 ) THE case of the plaintiff/respondent is that the contract awarded to him continued till date as it was operative for a period of three years and the defendant/appellant committed breach of terms of the contract by terminating it vide letter dated 13. 9. 1996. On the contrary, the case of the appellant/defendant is that the contract that commenced on 16. 2. 1996 was to be operative only for a period of one year. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant had reserved the right to terminate the contract and according to Section 14 (1) (c) of the Act such a contract cannot be specifically enforced, and as such the plaintiff s suit for injunction to prevent breach of such a contract is barred under Section 41 (e) of the Act. It was also contended by the learned counsel that a breach of the contract of this nature can always be compensated in money, the plaintiff s suit for injunction is not maintainable and the learned trial court has committed a patent illegality in granting ad interim injunction in favour of the respondent.

( 5 ) IT is beyond the pale of controversy that t

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