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1996 Supreme(Del) 348
High Court Of Delhi
CHANDRA PARKASH - Appellant
Versus
STATE - Respondent
Decided On : 04/15/1996
The Delhi Police had jurisdiction to register the FIR against the petitioners for offenses under Sections 406 and 498-A of the IPC, despite the marriage and entrustment of dowry taking place outside of Delhi, as part of the cause of action arose in Delhi due to the engagement ceremony and entrustment of dowry articles there.
Headnote:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE - SECTION 181(4) - SECTION 406 - SECTION 498-A - JURISDICTION - LIMITATION - DOWRY - FIR - QUASHING - The Delhi High Court held that the Delhi Police had jurisdiction to register an FIR against the petitioners for offenses under Sections 406 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), despite the marriage and entrustment of dowry taking place outside of Delhi. The court found that part of the cause of action arose in Delhi due to the engagement ceremony and entrustment of dowry articles there. The court also held that the complaint under Section 406 was not barred by limitation as the cause of action continues until the articles are returned or accounted for. The court further held that the complaint under Section 498-A was not barred by limitation as the respondent had lodged a complaint with the District Crime Cell in Delhi prior to the present complaint.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners, Chander Prakash and others, were aggrieved by the registration of an FIR against them under Sections 406 and 498-A of the IPC by the Delhi Police. They sought to quash the FIR on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, limitation, and lack of a prima facie case.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the Delhi Police had jurisdiction to register the FIR as part of the cause of action arose in Delhi due to the engagement ceremony and entrustment of dowry articles there. The court also found that the complaint under Section 406 was not barred by limitation as the cause of action continues until the articles are returned or accounted for. The court further found that the complaint under Section 498-A was not barred by limitation as the respondent had lodged a complaint with the District Crime Cell in Delhi prior to the present complaint.
Issues: 1. Whether the Delhi Police had jurisdiction to register the FIR against the petitioners for offenses under Sections 406 and 498-A of the IPC? 2. Whether the complaint under Section 406 was barred by limitation? 3. Whether the complaint under Section 498-A was barred by limitation?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the Delhi Police had jurisdiction to register the FIR as part of the cause of action arose in Delhi due to the engagement ceremony and entrustment of dowry articles there. The court relied on Section 181(4) of the CrPC, which provides that offenses of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust may be enquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which was the subject of the offence was received or retained or was required to be returned or accounted for by the accused person. 2. The court held that the complaint under Section 406 was not barred by limitation as the cause of action continues until the articles are returned or accounted for. 3. The court held that the complaint under Section 498-A was not barred by limitation as the respondent had lodged a complaint with the District Crime Cell in Delhi prior to the present complaint.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition and upheld the registration of the FIR against the petitioners.
( 2 ) BRIEFLY the facts of the case are that complainant Smt. Rekha Thakur was married to petitioner No. 1 at Nazibabad, District Bijnaur, U. P. After marriage the parties resided at their matrimonial home at Mohalla Singhan, Kashipur, Distt. Nainital, U. P. The marriage took place on 9th July, 1989. However, within a few days respondent No. 2 filed a petition under S. 12 read with S. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for declaring the marriage null and void alternatively for dissolution of the marriage in the Court of Civil Judge at Bijnaur, U. P. Thereafter on 15th March, 1993 respondent No. 2 withdrew that petition. It is the case of petitioners that after coming to Delhi to the house of her brother complainant she has filed the present complaint with the Crime Against Women Cell on the basis of which the present FIR No. 204/94 was registered under S. 406/498-A, IPC.
( 3 ) NOW adverting to the first objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction taken by petitioners, we must keep in mind that marriage was solemnised at Nazibabad (U. P. ). The articles of dowry i. e. stridhan was also given at Nazibabad where marriage took place. Taking these factors into consideration Mr. K. S. Sharma, counsel for the petitioners contended that merely shifting to Delhi by the respondent No. 2 will not clothe Delhi Courts with the jurisdiction to the police to register a case against the petitioners : Under S. 181 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short the Cr. P. C.) provisions have been made to take out proceedings against offences of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of Trust. Section 181 (4) provides that the said offences may be enquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which was the subject of the offence was received or retained or was required to be returned or accounted for by the accused person. Therefore, relying on this provision, Mr. Sharma contended that neither the offence of receiving the dowry was committed at Delhi nor articles were returned or required to be accounted for at Delhi, therefore, Delhi Court has no jurisdiction. In this regard he placed REFERRED TO the decision of Harjeet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, AIR 1986 Cri LJ 2070 (P and H), where the question involved was whether the complaint could be filed for the misappropriation of property by the wife at place where she was residing, though the entrustment had taken place elsewhere. The Court after analysing these provisions opined that the requisite requirement is to determine as to what was the stipulation, if any, between the parties as to where the goods were to be returned or to be accounted for. In the absence of any such stipulation that Court would have the jurisdiction where the goods in question were kept as trust and the breach in respect thereof was committed, Relying on these observations Mr. Sharma contended that since goods as alleged were entrusted at Najibabad and are kept at Kashipur hence no cause of action arose at Delhi. The goods could either be returned or accounted for at Kashipur or at Najibabad, but by no stretch of imagination at Delhi. To get further support he placed REFERRED TO the decision of th
