( 1 ) THE petitioner in this writ petition has sought for a direction to the respondents to allow the petitioner to function as the Principal of the Guru Harkishan Public School, Punjabi Bagh, New Delhi as the suspension of the petitioner stood revoked in terms of letter dated 10. 4. 1996 issued by the respondent No. 3 and/or ensure compliance of the aforesaid order dated 10. 4. 1996.

( 2 ) THE petitioner was promoted as the Principal of the Guru Harkishan Public School, Punjabi Bagh in the month of September, 1992. The appointment of the petitioner as the Principal of the said school was approved and confirmed by the Governing Body of the School after she was selected by the Promotion Committee.

( 3 ) HOWEVER, through letter dated 12. 3. 1996 the petitioner was put under suspension from the Principalship of the school as she was found guilty of certain charges. In the said letter it was further stated that the decision to suspend the petitioner was taken at a meeting of the Governing Body of the school and that a detailed charge sheet would follow.

( 4 ) SECTION 8 of the Delhi School Education Act deals with the power and jurisdiction of the Managing Committee of a recognised Private School. The relevant provisions are extracted below:

"8. Terms and conditions of service of employees of recognised private schools (4) Where the managing committee of a recognised private school intends to suspend any of its employees, such intention shall be communicated to the Director and no such suspension shall be made except with the prior approval of the Director. PROVIDED that the managing committee may suspend an employee with immediate effect and without the prior approval of the Director if it is satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reason of the gross misconduct, within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under section 2, of the employee; PROVIDED FURTHER that no such immediate suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of fifteen days from the date of suspension unless it has been communicated to the Director and approved by him before the expiry of the said period. (5) Where the intention to suspend, or the immediate suspension of, an employee is communicated to the Director, he may if he is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension, accord his approval to such suspension. "

( 5 ) IT is pertinent to state at this stage that the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association Vs. Union of India and others; reported in AIR 1987 SC 311 has held that the aforesaid provisions in respect of power of suspension and extent thereof are also applicable to unaided minority institution like the present school. The following paragraphs from the said decision are extracted below:-

"thus, Sections 8 (1), 8 (3), 8 (4) and 8 (5) do not encroach upon any right of minorities to administer their educational institutions. Section 8 (2), however, must, in view of the authorities, be held to interfere with such right and, therefore, inapplicable to minority institutions. Section 9 is again inocuous since Section 14 which applies to unaided minority schools is virtually on the same lines as Section 9. We have already considered Section 11 while dealing with Section 8 (3 ). We must, therefore, hold that Section 11 which makes the provisions of Chapter IV inapplicable to unaided minority schools is discriminatory not only because it makes Section 10 inapplicable to minority institutions, but also because it makes Sections 8 (1), 8 (3), 8 (5), 9 and II inapplicable to unaided minority institutions. That the Parliament did not understand Sections 8 to II as offending the fundamental right guaranteed to the minorities under Article 30 (1) is evident from the fact that Chapter IV applies to aided minority institutions and it cannot for a moment be suggested that surrender of the right under Article 30 (1) is the price which the aided minority institutions h