( 1 ) HERE is yet another writ petition seeking the quashing of a detention order passed under section 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act.

( 2 ) FIRST, the facts. The petitioner Gurdas Seal is one of the eleven partners of M/s. S. C. Dey and B. N. Seal. He also happens tobe one of the five partners of yet another firm carrying on business under the name and style of M/s. Seal, Lataand Co. This case. however, relates to M/s. S. C. Dey and B. N. Seal which holds a licence for dealing as bullion merchants. On January 21. 1993 the officers of the Customs, Calcutta searched the shop premises of M/s. S. C. Dey and B. N. Seal and seized eight gold biscuits of foreign origin allegedly from inside a cylinder-shaped iron box kept concealed in a room which otherwise was full of rubbish. As per the Customs the said gold biscuits were seized on the reasonable belief (hat those were smuggled in India as none of the partners including the petitioner present there, could produce any document in support of their legal acquisition. possession or importation and as all of them confessed in their respective statements that the said gold biscuits had been smuggled. However, on the other hand the version of the petitioner is that the said gold biscuits had been legally purchased from one A. M. Salley and had been accounted for in (heir records and that the so-called confessional statements were not voluntary.

( 3 ) ON April 26, 1993 the detaining authority passed the impugned order of detention of the petitioner in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 (1) of the Act considering the same to be necessary "with a view to preventing him from dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in iransporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods in future".

( 4 ) THE perusal of the writ petition would go to show that detention has been challenged on number of grounds. However, during arguments the learned counsel for the petitioner sought (he quashing of [he order only on two grounds. His first contention was that while passing the impugned order, the detaining authority had relied upon totally irrelevent documents betraying thereby lack of application of mind. Secondly, it was urged that there was inordinate and unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation made by the petitioner.

( 5 ) THE first contention first. However, even before that a word or two on the law for it holds the key. And the law is that if irrelevant material has been taken into consideration by the detaining Authority while arriving at his subjective satisfaction, then it displays non-application of mind. which in turn would vitiate the order of detention. [see: Ramesh v. State of Gujarat and Ors. AIR 1989 SC 1881: Chhagan Bhdgwan Kahar- v. N. L. Kalna and others AIR 1989 SC 1234: Vashisht Narain Karwaria v. Union of India and others AIR 1990sc 1272].

( 6 ) AS far back as in the year 1975. the Supreme Court had observed in Sadhu Roy v. The State of West Bengal AIR 1979 SC 919:

"the satisfaction, though alternated by "subjectivity" must be real and rational not random divination, must flow from an advertance to relevant factors, not be a mook recital or mechanical chant of statutorily sanctified phrases. "and it was further made clear, this time in Smt. Shalini Soni v. Union of India and Others 1980crl. L. J. 1487:

"it is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote. " (emphasis supplied)

( 7 ) THE law being as noticed above, it is time to revert to the first contention. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that at least the following documents relied upon by the detaining Authority had no relevance to the order of detentio