( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act read with Order 43, Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 27. 9. 1993. The appeal is preferred by the plaintiffs.

( 2 ) THE appellants filed the suit under Section 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act seeking the filing of the arbitration agreement and a reference to arbitration as Suit No. 3708/91. In the suit, the appellants Relied on upon the agreement dated 27. 8. 1990 (Annexures G and H in this F. A. O) contending that certain disputes have arisen between the parties which required to be referred to arbitration. The appellants are contending that the two agreements are licence agreements while the respondents are contending that though the agreements dated 27. 8. 1990 are true and purport to be agreements of licence, their real nature is that they must be treated as lease agreements. A further objection has been raised that the agreements , though they bear stamp duty of Rs. 5. 00 each sufficient to treat them as agreements of licence, they must be treated as lease agreements and are insufficiently stamped, if so treated.

( 3 ) UNDER the impugned order dated 27. 9. 1993, the learned Single Judge- did not decide whether the agreements are agreements of licences as they, on their face, purport to be or, whether they really amounted to lease deeds or agreements to lease. He did not even say that if treated as agreements of licence, the stamp duty of Rs. 5. 00 on which each of them was engrossed, was not sufficient. Nor did he decide that their real nature was different and that they must be treated as leases or agreements of lease. Instead he passed an order on 27. 9. 1993 - "be sent for adjudication to the Collector of Stamps". It is against this order that the plaintiffs have come up in appeal.

( 4 ) A preliminary objection is raised for the respondents that while Order 43, Rule I Civil Procedure Code is not attracted, the order of the learned Single Judge is not even a "judgment" so as to fall within Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. Reliance is placed on Shah Babulal Khimji s case (AIR 1981 SC 1786 ).

( 5 ) ON the other hand, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the order affects valuable rights of the parties and that it is appealable under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act in view of the general principle mentioned in Shah Babulal Khimji s case (supra ). Reference is made to certain other Judgments of the Delhi High Court and of the Supreme Court dealing with the question as to what is " Judgment".

( 6 ) IT is true that without going into any question, the learned Single Judge has passed an order referring the agreements for "adjudication" while it is true, as contended for the respondents that under Section 33 (2) (b), the duty of "examining" and "impounding" any instrument "may" be delegated to an officer, we are clearly of the view that the provision is an enabling one and does not preclude a Judge sitting on the Original Side of the High Court from "examining" the question whether the instruments are "licence agreements" bearing sufficient stamp duty or whether, on a construction thereof, they must be deemed to be lease agreements or leases requiring higher stamp duty.

( 7 ) BUT the question is whether the order referring the matter to adjudication is a judgment . Unless an appeal lies, we cannot interfere.

( 8 ) THE Judgment in Shah Babulal Khimji s case (supra) is the leading Judgment as to the meaning of judgment". It, no doubt, says that if by an order of a learned Single Judge valuable rights of the parties are affected, then it can amount to a judgment". If the matter rested merely on applying the abovesaid general principle to an order sending documents for adjudication under the Stamp Act, we would have considered whether the impugned order does not affect valuable rights of parties. But, unfortunately, for the appellant, there is a specific passage