Acquisition of a residential flat by the tenant's spouse, whether benami or not, constitutes a ground for eviction under Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, as it deprives the tenant of the need for the tenanted premises.

( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against order of Rent Control Tribunal dated September 26, 1987 by which he confirmed the order of eviction passed by an Additional Rent Controller on. August 20, 1987 on the ground of eviction covered by clause (h) of proviso to Sub Section I of Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act by giving a finding that tenant has acquired a residential flat bearing No. 12, Vasant Vihar in the name of his wife, Asha Rastogi.

( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant, in assailing the impugned order, has contended that onus was on the respondent/ landlord to prove that in fact the flat acquired by appellant s wife is a benami transaction and the real owner is the appellant and in the present case, no such evidence has come on the record and even the two tribunals have not upheld the case of the landlord that the tenant had acquired the said flat benami in name of his wife and thus, the impugned order is vitiated on that score. He has also contended that mere acquisition of a residential flat by the tenant s wife does not furnish any ground of eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act. He has strongly placed reliance on a case decided by Single Bench of this Court in. case of Revti Devi Vs. Kishan Lal, (1) 1970 Rent Control Reporter 71 and also on the pronouncement by the Supreme Court in B. R. Mehta Vs. Atma Devi, (2) AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2220 and has fried to distinguish the judgment given by the Supreme Court in case of Prem Chand Vs. Singh Singh, (3) 1981 Delhi Rent Judgments 287.

( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has contended that ratio of the law laid down in the case of Prem Chand (supra) endorsed by Supreme Court in case of B. R. Mehta (supra) clearly applies to the facts of the present case even though the landlord has not been able to prove that the residential flat has been acquired benami in the name of the wife of the tenant. He has also placed reliance in a case decided by Since Bench of this Court in V. K. Malhotra Vs. Smt. Ranjit Kaur, (4) 1985 (1) R. C. J. 250 and a judgment of the Single Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Hamukhlal Raichand Shah Vs. Arvindbhai Mohanlal Kapadia, (5) 1988 (2) K. C. J. 573.

( 4 ) THE amended definition of tenant given in Section 2 (1) of Delhi Rent Control Act makes the spouse, who has been ordinarily living in the premises with the tenant, as a tenant on death of the tenant. It is quite clear that if a statutory tenant dies, the tenancy is inheritable by his or her spouse in case the spouse has been living with the tenant at the time of his death. Before the amendment of this particular definition of tenant , a legal view was being reiterated by the Courts that on death of a statutory tenant, the tenancy is not inheritable. The ground of eviction covered by clause (h) lays down that in case the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a residence, he then becomes liable to eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act.

( 5 ) IT is true that while interpreting the said Section, this Court in case of Revti Devi (supra) held that there is no law according to which the husband and the wife can be deemed to be one person and unity of the family may also require that a husband would always live with his wife, but this does not, however, mean in law that. the property of the wife belongs equally to the husband. In such a situation, mere fact that the wife has acquired another residence would not lead to inference that the husband had also acquired such a residence and mere occupation of a new residence by a tenant without any legal right in the same would not be covered by the said clause. It was also laid down that the fact that due to the affection between the husband and wife, the wife will not turn her husband out from the house is not a circumstance which can be taken into account in construing the legal language.

( 6 ) IN the case o