1993 Supreme(Del) 365
High Court Of Delhi
KRISHAN LAL KOHLI - Appellant
Versus
V.K.KHANNA - Respondent
C.M. 3045 of 1991
Decided On : 07/12/1993
NANDINI SAHNI, P.Jagirdar, RAJIV BEHL, Ravinder Sethi
A party seeking an injunction must satisfy the court that there is a prima facie case, that irreparable injury will be caused if the injunction is not granted, and that the balance of convenience is in their favor.
Headnote:
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - AGREEMENT OF LEASE - PRIMA FACIE CASE - IRREPARABLE INJURY - BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE - INJUNCTION - UNDERTAKING BY LANDLORD AND WOULD-BE TENANT/LICENSEE - SALE OF PROPERTY - UNDERTAKING BY PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, Mr. Kohli, filed an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge, who had granted an injunction restraining him from delivering possession of the premises to any other person other than the respondent, Mr. Khanna, who claimed to be the tenant under an agreement of lease.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the respondent had made out a prima facie case for specific performance of the agreement of lease, and that irreparable injury would be caused to him if the injunction was not granted. The court also found that the balance of convenience was in favor of the respondent.
Issues: 1. Whether the respondent had made out a prima facie case for specific performance of the agreement of lease? 2. Whether irreparable injury would be caused to the respondent if the injunction was not granted? 3. Whether the balance of convenience was in favor of the respondent?
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the respondent had satisfied the conditions for the grant of an injunction, namely, the existence of a prima facie case, irreparable injury, and the balance of convenience. The court also held that the interests of justice would be best served if, in the event that the premises were vacated or sold, the landlord and would-be tenant/licensee or the parties to the transaction gave an undertaking to the court that they would be bound by any decree in favor of the respondent and would deliver possession of the premises to him if so ordered by the court.
Final Decision: The appeal was partly accepted, but with no order as to costs. The court ordered that in case the premises were vacated and sought to be let out to another tenant or given on license, or if Mr. Kohli decided to sell the property, an undertaking to the same effect would be given by the parties to the transaction. The court made it clear that no such transaction would be entered into without the execution and acceptance of such an undertaking by the court.
( 1 ) THE facts are eloquent and speak for themselves. In the posh locality of Saket in South Delhi there is a building bearing No. E-26. It is built on a plot of land measuring approximately 500 sq. yards. There is a basement, besides the ground floor comprising of threebed rooms with attached toilet, drawing-cum-dining room besides, of course,a lawn in front. It is owned by the present petitioner Mr. Krishan Lalkohli, a non-resident Indian who has an attorney in India. That attorneyis Marshal (retd.) M. L. Sethi. The building, at present, is in possession of atenant. It is claimed that on 19/04/1989 it was let out to Pepsi Foods ona rental of Rs. 7000. 00 per month through Mr. Ranjit Salve who was earlieremployed with M/s. Pepsi Foods and who claims that it is he who is thetenant in his personal capacity. It is, however, not disputed that it is hewho is presently in occupation of the building. Much before 19/04/1989negotiations for letting out the premises had taken place with respondentno. 1, Mr. V. K. Khanna. Mr. Khanna in fact claims that those negotiations had resulted in the execution of an agreement of lease between him andthe said Air Marshal M. L. Sethi. It is alleged that the said agreement wasexecuted on 9/01/1989 though possession was to be delivered to himon 1/04/1980 from which date the tenancy was to commence. Mr. Khanna further alleges that rent was agreed to be Rs. 2000. 00 per month. Aswould be obvious from what I have noticed above, the possession was neverdelivered to Mr. Khanna. Instead, the premises were let out on 19/04/1989 to another party. On 20/04/1989 Mr. Khanna filed a suit for specific performance basing his entire claim on the said agreement of lease. Alongwith that suit he moved an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application, itneed hardly be mentioned, was contested. After hearing the parties, thelearned Subordinate Judge disposed of that application by his order dated 9/09/1991 holding that the plaintiff (Mr. Khanna) had made out aprima facie case. The learned Court taking notice of the fact that the premises were in possession of defendant No. 2 i. e. Mr. Ranjit Salve extendedits protective hands to him but restrained Mr. Kohli from delivering possession of the premises to any other person. Aggrieved by that order Mr. Kohli has filed this appeal.
( 2 ) MR. Ravinder Sethi, Senior Advocate submitted that no agreement of lease had ever been entered into with Mr. Khanna and that thealleged lease deed was actually a forged document. In support he drew myattention to the affidavit of Air Marshal M. L. Sethi wherein he has claimedthat he had never executed the document and that it did not bear his signatures. Mr. Ravinder Sethi also drew my attention to the admitted signaturesof Air Marshal Sethi on his affidavit and to the disputed signatures on thelease deed and submitted that even a cursory look by naked eye would go toshow that the admitted and the disputed signatures did not tally with eachother. It was further argued that in any case the document being unregistered Mr. Khanna could not take benefit of the same and in support myattention was drawn to a judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Bajaj Autoltd. v. Bihari Lal Kohli, J. T. 1989 (3) S. C. 324 and to a judgment of thiscourt in Smt. Abnash Rani Suri v. Smt. Santosh Chowdhry and. Anr. ,1991rlr 159. It was also the contention of Mr. Ravinder Sethi that one couldnot possibly believe that a person would agree to letting out a premises on amonthly rent of Rs. 2,000. 00 when house tax amounting to Rs. 26,000. 00 wasbeing paid and when on 19/04/1989 itself the premises bad actually beenlet out on a monthly rent of Rs. 7,000. 00.
( 3 ) ON the other band my attention was drawn by Mr. Rajiv Behl,the learned Counsel for the respondents, to as many as 8 photographs filedbefore the learned Trial Court by Mr. Khanna. It was claimed that ahavan was performed in the premises it