The court's discretion in disposing of applications under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the scope of the court's authority to make provisions regarding jointly owned property after the main divorce petition is decided.

( 1 ) SMT. Aruna Madan has filed this revision petitionagainst the order dated 20. 10. 1993 of Shri J. D. Kapoor, learned Additional Districtjudge, Delhi, vide which he directed that an application under Section 27 of thehindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as the act ) moved by the petitionerwould be disposed of independently and fixed 9. 11. 1993 for final disposal of thepetition for divorce filed against her by her husband Shri Subhash Madan,respondent herein.

( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts leading to the filing of this revision petition are thatsubhash Madan (hereinafter referred to as the husband ) filed a petition fordivorce against Smt. Aruna Madan (hereinafter referred to as the wife ) on 25. 9. 85. The proceedings continued for a long period and ultimately the evidence of theparties was closed and the case came up for final arguments for the first time on29. 5. 1991. A number of applications were moved by the wife. An application undersections 24/26 of the Act was moved by the wife for enhancement of the mainte-nance. This application was disposed of by the Trial Court on 26. 5. 1992, whichorder was challenged in the High Court wherefrom the stay was ultimately vacatedon 2. 4. 1993 in Civil Revision No. 409 of 1992. The case came up for final argumentsbefore the learned Trial Court on 20. 11. 1993 when an application under Section 27of the Act was filed by the wife in which it was inter alia pleaded that after hermarriage she was taken to his house by the husband and the attitude of the husbandand his family members was not cordial towards her since their expectation ofdowry was much more than what was given. It was also pleaded that she wasdeserted by the husband and all herornaments, clothes, valuable household goods,gifts and presents belonging to her, which formed her Istridhan, have been retainedby the husband with him and the details were mentioned in the annexure. A prayerwas, thus, made that the husband be directed to return the items of the Istridhanbelonging to her. The learned Trial Court passed the impugned order and fixed thecase for final arguments.

( 3 ) I have heard Ms. Geeta Luthra, Counsel for the petitioner/wife, as also Dr. S. Bazaz, Counsel for the respondent/husband. I have also perused the file.

( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that a bare reading ofsection 27 of the Act makes it incumbent on the Trial Court that this application hasto be disposed of while disposing of the petition for divorce and the learned Trialcourt has gravely erred in directing the same to be disposed of independently. Itwould, at this stage, be appropriate to quote Section 27 of the Act, which reads asfollows:

"27. Disposal of property : In a proceeding under this Act, the Court maymake such provisions in the decree as it deems just and proper withrespect to any property presented, at or about the time of marriage, whichmay belong jointly to both the husband and the wife. "

( 5 ) THERE is no doubt that Section 27 does provide that a provision can be madein the decree in any proceedings under the Act but that does not show that such aprovision cannot be made after the main case is decided. It would at this stage beappropriate to refer to the case Smt. Surinder Kaur v. Madan Gopal Singh (AIR 1980punjab and Haryana 334) and Gurcharan Singh v. Ajmer Kaur (II (1983) DMC 128)

( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment ofthe Punjab and Haryana High Court in the matter of Dr. Suraj Prakash v. Mohinderpal Sharma (I (1988) DMC 104 ). There is no doubt that in this judgment it has beenheld that the Trial Court could not pronounce order on an application filed undersection 27 of the Act after the main petition is decided. A perusal of this judgmentshows that two earlier judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, referred toearlier, have not been referred to. Learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the provisions of Section 27 of the Ac