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1992 Supreme(Del) 276

High Court Of Delhi
PRITHI PAL SINGH - Appellant
Versus
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA - Respondent
Interim Application 2645 of 1992
Decided On : 05/10/1992

Advocates Appeared:
Ashok Sapra, K.K.Mehra, S.K.CHAUDHARY

A party seeking an injunction must disclose all material facts to the court, and any concealment of material facts may result in the injunction being vacated.

Headnote:

INJUNCTION - DISPUTE BETWEEN MEMBERS OF ASSOCIATION - SUIT FOR INJUNCTION - FACT THAT DISPUTE ALREADY SUBJECT OF LITIGATION IN ANOTHER COURT - CONCEALMENT OF FACT BY PLAINTIFF - INJUNCTION VACATED.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff, claiming to be the President of Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association (HPCA), sought an injunction against the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) to accept him as the nominee of HPCA. The plaintiff alleged that the BCCI recognized another individual as the president of HPCA without giving him an opportunity to be heard.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the plaintiff had concealed the fact that a suit was already pending in a Himachal Pradesh court regarding the dispute between him and the other individual claiming to be the president of HPCA. The court also found that the plaintiff had misrepresented facts in his application for injunction.

Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining the BCCI from recognizing another individual as the president of HPCA. 2. Whether the plaintiff had concealed the fact of the pending suit in the Himachal Pradesh court.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction because he had concealed the fact of the pending suit in the Himachal Pradesh court. The court also found that the plaintiff had misrepresented facts in his application for injunction. The court further held that the injunction granted earlier was only for a specific meeting and not for any subsequent meetings.

Final Decision: The court vacated the stay granted in favor of the plaintiff and clarified that the ex-parte injunction granted earlier pertained only to a specific meeting and not for any subsequent meetings.

Usha Mehra

( 1 ) SHRI Prithipal Singh alleges to be continuing as the President of Himachal Pradesh Cricket Assocaition (hereinafter referred to as H. P. C. A.) since 1980, and therefore sought directions against defendant No. I, the Board of Control for Cricket in India, to accept him as nominee of H. P. C. A. , being its president.

( 2 ) IN short the case of the plaintiff is that the defendant no. 1, a registered body, was established with the object of controlling the game of cricket in India. It has its own Rules and Regulations, according to which various Associations in India who are Full Members of the said Board have to send one representative on the Board of defendant No. 1. H. P. C. A. is the "full Member" of defendant No. 1. Plaintiff being President had been representing the HPCA as its representative. Being its president, all the correspondence had been exchanged between defendant No. 1 with the plaintiff in pursuance to the circulars issued by defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2. On 31st July, 1991, plaintiff attended the meeting of the defendant No. 1 as the representative of the H. P. C. A. Defendant No. 4 was earlier the Vice- president of the said Association, but subsequently claimed to be the president of HPCA, which fact the plaintiff has denied. News item was also given wherein it was reported that defendant No. 3 as the president of defendant No. 1 had recognised the claim of defendant No. 4 as president of HPCA. Before acknowledging the claim of defendant No. 4, defendants I to 3 never called upon the plaintiff nor given any reasonable opportunity of being heard. The General Body Meeting of the Board of defendant No. 1 was scheduled to be held on 28th and29th September, 1991, in which election of its office bearers were to take place. On 25. 9. 91, defendant No. 3 recognised defendant No. 4 as the president of HPCA and allowed him to attend the meeting of the Board of defendant No. 1 as respresentative of the HPCA to be held on 28th September, 1991. This decision was conveyed to the plaintiff, whereas some members of the HPCA had authorised the plaintiff to represent the HPCA in the meeting to be held by defendant No. 1. It is in this background that the injunction was sought by the plaintiff.

( 3 ) NOTICE of this application was issued to the defendants. Defendants I to 3 filed the written statement and so did the defendant No. 4. They also filed the replies. In the replies it has been pleaded that so far as the dispute between the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 is concerned that is already a subject matter of litigation in Himachal Pradesh Court. The matter being subjudice, the present suit is not maintainable. Even otherwise the interim relief if granted, would amount to decreeing the suit. The suit has otherwise become infructuous because the plaintiff was allowed to attend the meeting held on 29th September, 1991. Therefore, the suit has become infructuous.

( 4 ) I have heard Mr. Ashok Sapra for the plaintiff, Mr. S. K. Chaudhary for defendant No. 4 and Mr. K. K. Mehra for defenddants 1 and2. Mr. Chaudhary has filed the order passed by Shri M. K. . Bansal, Sub Judge 1st Class (II) Hamirpur, dated 18. 12. 91. Vide the said order he has restrained by way of ad-interim injunction, the present plaintiff from interfering into the day-to-day functioning of the HPCA and also from proclaiming to be president and holding any other meeting in this respect, till further orders. The present plaintiff has filed the written statement and reply in the said suit. But this fact he concealed from this Court when he filed the present suit on 27. 9. 91. At no stage he brought this fact to the notice of the Court not even subsequently, that the defendant No. 4 and the HPCA have filed a suit against him at Hamirpur.

( 5 ) THEREFORE, in view of this concealment of fact, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. Even otherwise nothing survives because meetings against which he wanted restrained order have already been



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