A dispute regarding the interpretation of a tariff is referable to arbitration if it arises between the parties under a valid arbitration agreement.

( 1 ) THESE eight appeals are directed against the judgment dated November 21, 1990 delivered by the learned Single Judge whereby the eight petitions under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act treated as suits (Suit Nos. 2026, 2233, 2286, 2273, 2291, 2348, 2642 and 2646 of 1990) were allowed and a direction was given that the arbitration agreements be filed in Court and the learned Single Judge appointed Shri Dalip Singh, Advocate as the sole arbitrator and referred the dispute for his decision.

( 2 ) THE dispute that has been referred relates to the question as to whether under the tariff issued by the appellant for the year 1990-91, the appellant can charge minimum guarantee charges in addition to the actual consumption charges.

( 3 ) ACCORDING to the learned Single Judge the dispute is covered under Clause 15 of the agreement. The respondent is a consumer of mixed load (HT) and the tariff in respect of mixed load (HT) regarding demand charges and another charges is as under :- Mixed load H. T. (a ). . . (b ). . . (e) TARIFF Demand Charges: Rs 40000 per month per KVA or part thereof of the committed load (as per load in the test report) plus Energy Charges; 67 paise per Untt : The above shall be without prejudice to the minimum demand laid down in (d) below and adjustment clause at (xviii) under General Conditions of Application. (d) Minimum Bill: The amount of the demand charges based upon the KVA of billing demand.

( 4 ) THE respondent s contention is that the respondent is not liable to tariff charges even when actual consumption charges exceeds the demand charges According to the respondent the word plus is to be read alongwith the subse auent tariff condition to the effect that-the above shall be without prejudice to the minimum demand as laid down-in (d) and clause (d) deals with minimum bill.

( 5 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel for the appellant, the tariff calls for no interpretation. It is clear that the consumer is also required to pay energy charges. Even if the energy charges are more than the demand charges still demand charges are to be paid by the consumer, i. e. if actual consumption of energy is much more or higher to the demand charges, still demand charges are liable to be paid by tue consumer. Demand charges have to be paid by the consumer over and above the actual compensation of energy charges.

( 6 ) THE learned Judge has found that the above tariff conditions need to be interpreted and as such dispute arises between the parties regarding the interpretation of the tariff and so the dispute is referable to the arbitation.

( 7 ) WE agree with the view of the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge was right and justified to hold that the dispute is covered under clause 15 of the agreement and as such the dispute is referable to arbitration.

( 8 ) THESE appeals, therefore, in our opinion, have no force so they are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.

( 9 ) CROSS objections have been filed in Appeals (FAO (OS) Nos. 224 to 230 of 1990) relating to Suit Nos. 2233, 2286, 2273, 2291,2348, 2642 and 2246 of 1990.

( 10 ) THE cross objections relate to two matters which the learned Single Judge declined to refer for arbitration. The first relates to the question of increasing of the billing demand from certain KVA to higher KVA. According to the respondent, upto March 1990 in all these cases the KVA was much less and suddenly in the month of April 1990 it was raised under the new tariff coming into effect w. e. f. April 1990. The relevant tariff for the year 1990-91 is as under: Demand Charges: Rs. 48. 00 per month per KVA or part thereof for the committed load (as per the load in the test report ). (d) Minimum bill: The amount of charges based upon the KVA of the billing demand.

( 11 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel for the respondents, the billing demand is not committed load. The billing demand is an average demand and assuch the billing demand could not be increased by the appellant