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1989 Supreme(Del) 203
High Court Of Delhi
KIRAN BEDI - Appellant
Versus
DELHI ADMINISTRATION - Respondent
Decided On : 05/04/1989
The parameters and scope of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act leave little room for the parties to get over-agitated, and frequent interruptions by applications or judicial proceedings in High Court or Supreme Court have a serious effect of eroding the said parameters.
Headnote:
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ACT - Appointment of Second Judge - Venue of Proceedings - Validity of Proceedings - Right to Representation - Scope of Inquiry - Expeditious Disposal of Inquiry - [S. B. Wad, J.]
Fact of the Case:
Petitioners sought a mandamus to Delhi Administration to fill the second vacancy in the Committee of Inquiry and to change the venue of the proceedings to a place outside Delhi. They also sought a blanket stay of further proceedings before the Committee of Inquiry till the final disposal of the writ petition.
Finding of the Court:
1. The word "may" in Section 3(3) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act cannot be read as "shall", creating an obligation on the Administration to fill the second vacancy. 2. By virtue of Section 8-A, a single judge can legally act as a Committee and continue the proceedings. 3. The Committee is not a quasi-judicial body, and the principle of joint responsibility and collective work cannot be read into it. 4. The use of the words "proposed to fill the vacancy" in the notification dated 27th February 1989 is not a statutory expression of any decision of the Government that it shall fill the vacancy. 5. The petitioners have no right to have a two-judge Committee, and the respondents have no right to have only one judge on the Committee. 6. The venue of the proceedings cannot be shifted outside Delhi or even inside Delhi by a writ of mandamus at the instance of the parties. 7. The Committee has all the powers to ensure the proper, peaceful, and orderly conduct of the proceedings. 8. The proceedings of the Committee held by the learned Single Judge were valid and proper by virtue of Section 8-A. 9. The parameters and scope of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act leave little room for the parties to get over-agitated. 10. Frequent interruptions by applications or judicial proceedings in High Court or Supreme Court have a serious effect of eroding the said parameters. 11. Expeditious disposal of Inquiry by the Commission is a legislative mandate and is in the public interest and in consonance with public policy.
Issues: 1. Whether the Delhi Administration has a legal obligation to fill the second vacancy in the Committee of Inquiry? 2. Whether the Committee can continue its proceedings with a single judge by virtue of Section 8-A of the Commissions of Inquiry Act? 3. Whether the Committee is a quasi-judicial body, and whether the principle of joint responsibility and collective work can be read into it? 4. Whether the use of the words "proposed to fill the vacancy" in the notification dated 27th February 1989 is a statutory expression of any decision of the Government that it shall fill the vacancy? 5. Whether the petitioners have a right to have a two-judge Committee, and whether the respondents have a right to have only one judge on the Committee? 6. Whether the venue of the proceedings can be shifted outside Delhi or even inside Delhi by a writ of mandamus at the instance of the parties? 7. Whether the Committee has all the powers to ensure the proper, peaceful, and orderly conduct of the proceedings? 8. Whether the proceedings of the Committee held by the learned Single Judge were valid and proper by virtue of Section 8-A? 9. Whether the parameters and scope of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act leave little room for the parties to get over-agitated? 10. Whether frequent interruptions by applications or judicial proceedings in High Court or Supreme Court have a serious effect of eroding the said parameters? 11. Whether expeditious disposal of Inquiry by the Commission is a legislative mandate and is in the public interest and in consonance with public policy?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The word "may" in Section 3(3) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act cannot be read as "shall", creating an obligation on the Administration to fill the second vacancy, because the Act does not lay down the minimum number or presence of any member obligatory. 2. By virtue of Section 8-A, a single judge can legally act as a Committee and continue the proceedings, as the section provides for continuation of the proceedings in the event of absence on any member or any vacancy having been created. 3. The Committee is not a quasi-judicial body, and the principle of joint responsibility and collective work cannot be read into it, as the Act does not oblige the Government to appoint two members as the minimum strength of a Commission. 4. The use of the words "proposed to fill the vacancy" in the notification dated 27th February 1989 is not a statutory expression of any decision of the Government that it shall fill the vacancy, as the word "proposed" clearly shows that the Delhi Administration did not intend to communicate any firm or final decision in this regard. 5. The petitioners have no right to have a two-judge Committee, and the respondents have no right to have only one judge on the Committee, as there is no legal obligation for Delhi Administration to fill the vacancy (or not to fill the vacancy) at the instance of the parties. 6. The venue of the proceedings cannot be shifted outside Delhi or even inside Delhi by a writ of mandamus at the instance of the parties, as the Lt. Governor's executive power does not extend beyond the territorial limits of Delhi and he is not competent to direct a sitting judge of this Court to go to some place outside Delhi and hold the Committee sessions there. 7. The Committee has all the powers to ensure the proper, peaceful, and orderly conduct of the proceedings, as it has the statutory power under Section 8 to do so. 8. The proceedings of the Committee held by the learned Single Judge were valid and proper by virtue of Section 8-A, as the section provides for continuation of the proceedings in the event of absence on any member or any vacancy having been created. 9. The parameters and scope of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act leave little room for the parties to get over-agitated, as the findings of the Commission do not propria vigore punish anyone or impose any penalty having judicial consequence for a person. 10. Frequent interruptions by applications or judicial proceedings in High Court or Supreme Court have a serious effect of eroding the said parameters, as they can delay the proceedings and substitute the discretion of the Judge constituting the Commission by the Judge hearing the petitions on the judicial side. 11. Expeditious disposal of Inquiry by the Commission is a legislative mandate and is in the public interest and in consonance with public policy, as public memory is short and the life of the Commission should not be long.
Final Decision: The writ petition was dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.
( 1 ) IN this writ petition the petitioners have sought a mandamus to Delhi Administration to fill up the second vacancy (in the Committee of Inquiry) in accordance with Government of India notification No. F. 10 (9)/98, dated February 22, 1988. They have also sought direction to the Committee of Inquiry to change the venue of the proceedings to a place outside Delhi. In the stay application a blanket stay of further proceedings before the Committee of Inquiry (till the final disposal of the writ petition) is sought. We have heard this writ petition for five days. On 27th April 1989 when hri K. T. S. Tulsi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners concluded his arguments by way of reply to the arguments on behalf of the respondents, he wanted to move an application for amending the writ petition. Since the petition had come at a very late stage and since we had heard the counsel for the petitioners at length, we refused the permission. At the time of the arguments, counsel for the respondents pointed out to us certain deviations made by the counsel for the petitioners from the original writ petition, and the earlier orders of this Court; but considering the fact that at those stages the petitioners had appeared in person we over-ruled those objections and permitted advocate Mr. Tulsi to make all the legal submissions arising out of the facts stated in the Writ petition. Since the starting of the actual proceedings before the Committee on 30 March 1988 and till the filing of the present writ petition four more writ petitions were filed, three in the Supreme Court and one in this Court, apart from the present writ petition. It is, therefore, pertinent to know the last order of the Committee, for appreciating the prayer for/stay of proceedings.
( 2 ) ON 14th March 1989, the Committee while rejecting the pleas of the petitioners that a Committee cannot function in the absence of a second judge and that the venue should be shifted outside Delhi reiterated the position that it could continue its proceedings by virtue of Section 8-A of the Commission of Inquiry Act. The petitioners Police Officers were then directed to be present before the Committee on 27th March 1989 for recording the statements. The writ petition was filed on 28th March 1989 and no stay was granted by this Court. The Committee heard the matter on April 3, 1989. On Mrs. Kiran Bedi s refusal to take witness stand and to take oath of affirmation, notice was directed to be issued to her to show cause as to why a complaint be not filed against her for an offence committed under Section 178 of the Indian Penal Code. The Committee thereafter adjourned the hearing from time to time as the writ petition was being beard before us.
( 3 ) AS regards the first plea of appointment of a second judge for filling the vacancy, counsel for the petitioners argued that although the Committee was appointed in exercise of the executive power, the petitioners have a right and Delhi Administration has a duty to appont the the second judge, particularly in view of the notifications of Delhi Administration dated 23rd February 1988 and 27th February 1989. The counsel submits that in the first notification dated 23rd February 1988 is was clearly propounded by the Delhi Administration that there shall be a Committee of two judges. He submits that the names of two judges were mentioned in the same notification. The notification was issued in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court. The notification was also Gazetted. The counsel further submits that in the notification dated February 27, 1989, the second para of the notification reads :
"it is also proposed to fill the vacancy caused in the Committee by the resignation of Justice N. N. Goswamy. A separate notification will issue in this regard. "in support of this submission that an executive order can be a basis for a writ of mandamus the counsel has cited some decisions. He has also relied upon the decision of the
