In an eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, once the landlord discharges the initial onus of proving that the letting purpose was residential, the onus shifts to the tenant to prove that the letting purpose was both commercial as well as residential.

( 1 ) THIS second appeal is directed against the judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi dated 24th February 1987 whereby the Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants under Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 18th September 1986.

( 2 ) THE respondent Shiv Charan Dass filed a petition for eviction of the appellants under Sec. 14 (l) (a) of the Act in respect of premises bearing no. 4234, Gali Mochian, Paharganj, New Delhi let out to the appellants. Since the premises were situated in the slum area, the respondent obtained permission of the Competent Authority under Section 19 (l) (a) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance Act) before filing the eviction petition before the Additional Rent Controller. It was pleaded in the eviction petition that the permises which consisted of two rooms, one kitchen, latrine, open court-yard and a Chhajja on the first floor of the above- mentioned property were let out originally to Shri Todar Mal, the father of the appellants for residential purpose On the death of Shri Todar Mal, the present appellants became tenant in the said property. There was no written document of tenancy. The agreed rent was Rs 30. 00 per month. It was further averred in the eviction petition: (l) that the appellants herein had failed to pay the arrears of rent in spite of repeated demands from 1st August 1978 to 31st August 1980; and (2) that the appellants had acquired another property bearing municipal no. 1730-D. Chuna Mandi, Paharganj, New Delhi after the creation of the tenancy of the premises in dispute about four years before filing of the eviction petition. The respondent did not press the ground of non-payment of rent before the Additional Rent Controller but only pressed the ground under Section 14 (l) (h) of the Act.

( 3 ) THE Additional Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the disputed premises were let out for residential purpose and the appellants having acquired another residential accommodation, they were liable, to be evicted under Section 14 (l) (h) of the Act. Before the rent Control Tribunal, this order was challenged and the Rent Control Tribunal gave a concurrent finding that the letting purpose was residential and the appellants having acquired another alternative residential accommodation, the eviction of th appellants was rightly ordered.

( 4 ) IT was not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants have acquired another residence. However, it was contended that the suit premises were let out to Shrt Todar Mal in the year 1930 for commercial cum residenti 1 purpose and were being used as such by the present appellants both for commercial as well as residential purpose. The respondent had not placed any evidence on record to show that the premises were let out only for residential purpose. The onus is on the landlord to prove that the premises were let out for residential purpose and the respondent, having failed to discharge that onus, were not entitled to get the appellants evicted from the premises on the ground that the appellants had acquired another residential accommodation. It was further contended that there was no document of tenancy and the whole case of the respondent is that the father of the appellants Shri Todar Mal took the premises in question by way of an oral agreement. The premises were used for commercial purpose right from the inception of the tenancy. It was further contended that the Additional Rent Controller as well as the Rent Control Tribunal wrongly placed the whole burden on the appellants to prov. e. that the premises were let out for commercial purpose and, therefore; the finding of both the courts below is vitiated.

( 5 ) ON the other hand, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that since there was no written document of tenancy, there was sufficient other c