The concept of 'family' should be interpreted reasonably and fairly, considering the social, religious, and economic conditions of life in India, as well as the peculiar circumstances of each case.

( 1 ) THE facts giving rise to the above mentioned appeals succinctly are that the appellant is a tenant under the respondent Smt. Sushila Bhargava in respect of a portion comprising two rooms, one kitchen and common use of bath and latrine on the ground floor besides two rooms on the mezzanine floor of house No. 101-E, Kamla Nagar, Delhi. The said house belongs to respondent No. 1 and Shri Raj Kumar Bhargava, respondent No. 2, is her husband. Way back in June 1969 the respondents filed an eviction petition against the appellant on two grounds, namely, (i) bona fide requirement of the landlady as residence for herself and members of her family dependent on her; and (ii) non-user of the demised premises by the appellant for a period of more than six months immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, falling under clauses Ce) and (d) respectively of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" ). Later on, in April 1974 the respondents moved another application for eviction of the appellant on the ground that the appellant had acquired vacant possession of another residential premises viz. first floor of house No. 61a, Banarasi Dass Estate, on 30th of November 1972, the said ground being covered by clause (h) of the proviso to Section 14 (1 ). Proceedings in both the cases were consolidated. Both the eviction petitions were vehemently contested by the appellant. Eventually the Additional Rent Controller vide order dated 31st January 1979 dismissed the eviction petition on ground under clauses Ce) and (h) but allowed the same on the ground under clause (d) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Act.

( 2 ) FEELING aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred an appeal against the same in the court of the Rent Control Tribunal being RCA No. 261/79. In the meantime, however, the respondent-landlady took out execution and dispossessed him from a part of the demised premises viz. bath room and the latrine The appellant moved an application under Section 45 of the. Act for restoration of the aforesaid amenities and the same was allowed by the Additional Rent Controller vide order dated 13th August 1979. She directed the responderts to restore the bath room and the lavatory immediately to the appellant. Dissatisfied with the same the respondents filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal, being appeal No. 842179. They also filed cross-objections against the order of the Additional Pent Controller dismissing the eviction petition on grounds falling under clauses (e) and (h ). The learned Rent Control Tribunal after hearing the parties set aside the finding of the trial Court with respect to the ground of eviction under clause (d) of the proviso to Section 14 (1 ). He also held that the appellant had not acquired any other residential accommodation as of right and, therefore, the ground of eviction under clause (h) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) too was not available. However, he held that tlie requirement of the respondent-landlady for residence of herself and members of her family was bona fide and genuine. Hence, he allowed the cross-ojections and directed eviction of the appellant under clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1 ). The Rent Control Tribunal also allowed the appeal of She respondents against the order of the Additional Rent Controller directing restoration of the amenities of bath room and latrine to them. Feeling dissatisfied, the appellant has come up in second appeal against the aforesaid order of the Rent Control Tribunal, S. A. O. No. 285180 being against the order of eviction and S. A. O. No. 303180 being against the order of restoration of amenities to the respondents. The respondentlandlady has, on the other hand, filed cross-objections questioning the correctness and legality of the order of the Rent Control Tribunal so far as it relates to the grounds of eviction under clauses (d) and (h) of the proviso to Sect