The landlord is entitled to evict the tenant if the tenant misuses the premises contrary to the terms of the lease agreement and the conditions imposed by the DDA, and the DDA is not willing to regularize the misuse permanently.

( 1 ) THIS second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short the Act ) is directed against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated October 4, 1982.

( 2 ) BY lease deed dated July 24, 1953 the Delhi Improvement Trust, predecessor-in-interest of the Delhi Development Authority, leased out a plot of land No. 12, Block No. B Western Extension Area, New Delhi to Rattan Lal. He constructed a building thereon and let out a portion, consisting of one room and a covered verandah in front thereof, to Narain Dass (respondent-tenant) on a monthly rent of Rs. 63. 00. Rattan Lal later sold this property to Manohar Lal (appellant/landlord) by a sale deed dated November 26, 1961. The respondent attorned to him as a tenant.

( 3 ) UNDER the terms of the lease deed granted by the D. DA. , the lessee was not entitled to use the said land and building that may be erected thereon for any other purpose than for the purpose of a residential house, without the consent in writing of the lessor. The tenant, however, used the tenanted premises for dairy business. This user, being contrary to the terms of the lease, was objected by the DD. A. The landlord consequently filed an application against the tenant for recovery of the possession of the premises indispute under clause (k) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Parties however, arrived at a compromise. The tenant agreed to pay 3/4th amount of the penalty or the premium levied by the DDA for the commercial use of the premises since November 27, 1961 upto date. The landlord agreed to withdraw the eviction petition which was consequently dismissed as such.

( 4 ) THE D D. A. thereafter refused to regularise the commercial user and served the appellant with a notice dated 27-5-74 to show cause as to why the lease be not cancelled for the breach of the said term. The landlord consequently filed a second application for eviction of the tenant from the said premises under clause (k)ofthe proviso to sub-section (i) of Section 14 of the Act. This petition was, however, dismissed on the ground that notice dated June 8, 1974, the basis of the eviction petition, was not a valid notice inasmuch as the tenant was not called upon to stop the alleged misuser of the premises and was not allowed any time for this purpose.

( 5 ) THE appellant thereafter served a fresh notice on the tenant and filed another eviction petition on July 4, 1977 for recovery of the possession of the premises under clause (k) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. It was alleged that the tenant not with standing the previous notice dated May 7, 1977 was using the tenanted premises for commercial purpose which was contrary to the conditions imposed on the landlord by the DDA while granting him the lease of the land on which the premises were situated. The D. D. A. was also made a party to this petition.

( 6 ) THE tenant admitted that he was carrying on the business of a dairy in the premises in dispute. He also admitted the receipt of the notice dated May 7, 1977 asking him to stop the commercial user. He, however, resisted the eviction on the pleas that it was barred by the principles of res-judicata and also under the provisions contained in Order 23 Rule 1 (4), Code of Civil Procedure; that the premises in dispute bad been let out for commercial purpose and were being used as such since the inception of the tenancy and that the DDA had been regularising the commercial user and this user could be regularised permanently, and that notice dated May 7, 1977 was invalid.

( 7 ) SH. J. M. Malik, Addl. Controller by his order dated September 17, 1979, observing that the learned counsel for the respondent had not picked up any conflict with the maintainability of the case, held that the petition was not barred by the provisions contained in Section 11, Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as the previous application had not been decided on merits. He further found that the notice da