( 1 ) BY an order dated 14/8/1984, Chadha, J. had dealt with this application. Aggrieved by the order of Chadha, J. , whereby he had granted stay of re-entry upon terms, a Letters Patent Appeal was filed, being L. P. A. No. 131 of 1984 by the petitioner, herein.

( 2 ) AT the hearing of the L. P. A. , on 2/5/1985, a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Prakash Narain, CJ. and N. N. Goswamy,j. , passed the order as under :

"it is not disputed that some of circulars and notifications as such were not before the learned single Judge. Perhaps what was shown to the learned single Judge was a summary of the various circulars issued from time to time. regarding, the fixation of market rates from notifications; however appears to have been shown. In our view and in all faikrness to. the parties concerned the learned single Judge may reconsider the prayers in C. M. 1114 of 1984. The contention of the appellant is that on a combined reading of these circulars it will be observed that the rate for conversion as demanded by the respondent is not legal. The respondent s contention is that even if the other circulars which were not before the learned single Judge, are now placed before the learned single Judge the result would be the same. We would not like to make any comment on this. We, therefore, accept the appea set aside the order dated 14-8-1984 and remit the case back to the learned single Judge for re-hearing on C. M. 1114 of 1984. No costs. . Interim orders of 22/3/1984, will continue to be operative till further orders in that regard are passed by the learned single Judge. The matter may be placed before the learned single Judge for directions as to hearing on 13/5/1985. "

( 3 ) THE matter has now been placed before me for "reconsideration the prayers in C. M. 1114 of 1984", and for "rehearing" on C. M. 1114 of 1984.

( 4 ) BEFORE me the main thrust of arguments of Mr. R. K. P. Shankardass has been that it is pleaded by him in his writ petition that by virtue of provisions of Section 14 of the Delhi Development Act, the contractual rights and obligations contained in the perpetual lease-deed (Clause 2 (5) and 2 (6) have been altered by operation of that law.

( 5 ) THE Delhi Development Act came into force in Delhi on 27/12/1957. This statute, its terms show, binds the government. As. stated by the Supreme Court in Superintendent and Legal Remembrancer, State of West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta, 1967 (2) SCR 170, a statute binds the government unless it expressly or by necessary implication exempts the State, No such exception is to be found in Delhi Development Act, 1957. Section 14 thereof reads as under :-

"14. After coming into operation of any of the plans in a zone no person shall use or permit to be used any land or building in that zone otherwise than in conformity with such plan :

PROVIDED that it shall be lawful to continue to use upon such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by regulations made in purpose and to the extent for and to which it is being used upon the date on which such plan comes into force. "

( 6 ) THE Master Plan for Delhi came into operation after it was approved by the Central Government on 1/9/1962. It is not disputed that according to the Master Plan the area with which we are concerned in this case, 13, Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi, is to be used for commercial purposes. The master Plan is statutory. This was so stated by the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kishan Dass and another, AIR 1969 S. C. 390. The Supreme Court said, "there is no controversy, in this case, that the Master Plan has been prepared under Section 7 by the Authority on 1/9/1962, and it has also come into force, as contemplated by Section 11. " Prima facie it appears to me that by virtue of the operation of the Delhi Development Act, and the statutory Master Plan for Delhi which, as stated above, came into force on 1/9/1962, the purpose for which plot No. 13, Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi co