1984 Supreme(Del) 44
High Court Of Delhi
HARDAYAL SINGH MEHTA - Appellant
Versus
NIRMALA DEVI - Respondent
First Appeal Order (OS) 89 of 1983
Decided On : 02/13/1984
Important Points
Subject
PRIVATE NUISANCE - UNLICENSED GUEST HOUSE
Act Referred
Headnote
NUISANCE - PRIVATE NUISANCE - DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, 1957 - DELHI POLICE ACT - UNLICENSED GUEST HOUSE - INTERIM INJUNCTION - BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE - REASONABLE INTERFERENCE WITH COMFORTABLE AND CONVENIENT ENJOYMENT OF LAND.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, Nirmala Devi, filed a suit against the defendants, the Mehtas, seeking an injunction to restrain them from running an unlicensed guest house in the premises adjacent to her residential flat. The plaintiff alleged that the running of the guest house caused various types of nuisance, including noise, disturbance, and interference with her privacy. The defendants contended that the plaintiff's suit was mala fide and that the guest house was not causing any actionable nuisance.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of nuisance and that the balance of convenience lay in favor of granting an injunction. The court noted that the defendants were running the guest house without a license, which was a violation of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and the Delhi Police Act. The court also found that the activities of the guest house were causing a substantial interference with the plaintiff's enjoyment of her property.
Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of nuisance. 2. Whether the balance of convenience lay in favor of granting an injunction.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of nuisance by showing that the defendants' activities were causing a substantial interference with her enjoyment of her property. The court noted that the defendants were running the guest house without a license, which was a violation of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and the Delhi Police Act. The court also found that the activities of the guest house were causing a substantial interference with the plaintiff's enjoyment of her property, including noise, disturbance, and interference with her privacy. 2. The court held that the balance of convenience lay in favor of granting an injunction. The court noted that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted, while the defendants would only suffer financial loss. The court also noted that the defendants were running the guest house illegally and that they had not shown any willingness to comply with the law.
Final Decision: The court granted an injunction restraining the defendants from running the guest house.
D.D.THAKUR, M.R.CHAWLA, MAN MOHAN KRISHAN, MUKUL ROHTAGI, S.C.SINGHA, U.C.SUKLA, Y.K.SABHARVAL, YOGESHVAR PRASAD
( 1 ) IN the judgment under appeal learned single judge has referred to relevant files of MCD and the Delhi Police regarding the grant of licences for running the guest house and has noted the fact that no licences have been granted to the Mehtas. But, the Mehtas have a grievance that these files did not constitute any evidence and no reliance could be placed on the same. I have examined the record of the suit and I find that full opportunity was granted to the parties to inspect these files and in fact after inspection of the files an affidavit was filed by Hardayal Singh Mehta (appellant ). The appellants have attacked the finding of the learned single judge that the approach to her residence is from the same staircase. The guest house being more or less a -public place the staircase must be used at all odd hours. The use of the premises as guest house by people who are addicted to liquor also cannot be ruled out . It is stated that there is no evidence to support this finding. A further attack is that the learned single judge could not take into account the fact that there were no licences to run the guest house in as much as the suit was based on the tort of private nuisance. On merits also it is contended that there was no ground to grant the interim relief.
( 2 ) I do not think there is anything wrong in the observations of the learned single judge. A judge is supposed to know the facts and realities of life. Under S. 114 of the Evidence Act, the court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the comon course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. The illustrations mentioned in this section are not exhaustive and other presumptions of a simiar kind can be made. A judge will know the attenant circumstances of running a guest house.
( 3 ) THE question that arises for consideration is : Is it reasonable that the plaintiff should have put up with the interference alleged in the suit ? The learned single judge summarised the various types of nuisance complained of in para 6 of his judgment. I will not give any credence to the plea of the Mehtas that Nirmala Devi has brought this suit mala fide only after her request to become a partner in the guest house was refused by them.
( 4 ) CLERK and Lindsell on Torts have defined nuisance as under :-
"the essence of nuisance is a condition or activity which unduly interferes with the use or enjoyment of land. In common parlance, stenches and smoke and a variety of different things may amount to a nuisance in fact but whether they are actionable as the tort of nuisance will depend upon a variety of considerations and a balancing of conflicting interests. An actionable nuisance is incapable of exact definition,. . . . . . Nuisance is an act or omission which is an interference with, disturbance of or annoyance to a person in the exercise of enjoyment of (a) right belonging to him as a member of the public, when it is a public nuisance, or (b) his ownership or occupation of land or of some easement, profit, or other right used or enjoyed in connection with land, when it is a private nuisance".
( 5 ) THIS commentry, while dealing with question of private nuisance, says that a private nuisance may be and usually is caused by a person doing on his own land something which he is lawfully entitled to do. His conduct only becomes a nuisance when consequences of his acts are not confined to his own land but extend to the land of his neighbour by unduly interfering with his neighbour in the comfortable and convenient enjoyment of his land. Nuisance of this kind are varied but to be actionable, however, the nuisance must be such as to be a real interference with the comfort or convenience of living according to the standards of an average man. The character of the neighbourhood will also have to be seen. Thus, to constitute the tort of private