( 1 ) THIS revision petition raises an important question of law, viz. , whether in a summons case the personal appearance of an accused can be dispensed with at the stage of recording his plea to the substance of accusation read out to him as laid down in Section 251, Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the code ).

( 2 ) THE facts germance to the decision of this question succinctly are that the petitioners-Nihal Singh, Parbash Joshi and S. K. Kohli were at the relevant time Editor-in-Chief, Editor and publisher of a reputed daily English newspaper Indian Express . On 4th November 1981 newspaper published a news item in its Delhi edition captioned "congress (1) Leader Blocks Checking of Food Stuff". The report inter alia, mentioned that the respondent-Arjan Das prevented a team of Delhi Administration officials led by Miss Khiangte. as IAS officer, from checking food samples. On the next following day, viz. , 5th November 1981 the said newspaper carried a further news item titled "police Case against Arjan Dass". The said report extracted passages from the FIR lodged by Miss Khiangte as also an inspection note which was sent by her to the department. Feeling incensed over the said report the respondent instituted a complaint under Section 500, Indian Penal Code, in the court of the Metropolitan Magistrate against the present petitioners and some other persons but we are not concerned with them. The petitioners moved separate applications for their exemption from personal appearance during the course of trial. However, the learned Magistrate declined their request vide order dated 25th January 1982. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners moved a petition under Section 482 of the Code being Cr. M (M) No. 76/82 for quashing the said order. The said petition came up for preliminary hearing on 11th February 1982 bsfore Kirpal, J. His Lordship while admitting the petition to hearing made a direction that "in the meantime the petitioners are exempted from personal appearance before the trial court on the dates of hearing fixed in the trial. " This order was made in Cr. M. 214/82. Subsequently, direction was made that the aforesaid interim order would continue till further orders. It would appear that the main petition is still pending and has not been disposed of. However, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate (Mrs. Deepa Sharma) vide order dated 5th January 1984 for receiving notice under Section 251 of the Code. e inter alia, observed :

"further I feel. that the attendance of the accused is necessary at the stage of notice under Section 251, Code of Criminal Procedure. The language of Section 251 Cr. P. C. as such requires that the particulars of the offence shall be stated to the accused and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or not or has any defence to make. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . There is nothing in the language which suggests that the pleader or any authorised person can received the notice on behalf of the accused and can plead guilty or not. "the learned Magistrate further observed that :

"the offence complained of in the instant case is not petty because the offence of defamation is punishable with imprisonment for two years. "

( 3 ) FEELING aggrieved, the petitioners have come up with this petition under Section 482 of the Code seeking to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this court to quash the impugned order as being illegal, void and wholly without jurisdiction.

( 4 ) I have heard the counsel for the parties at considerable length. The learned counsel for the petitioners has canvassed with great fervour that once exemption from personal attendance is granted to the accused, there is absolutely no bar to the substance of accusation being read out, as envisaged in Section 251 of the Code, to his lawyer representing him because appearance of the Pleader in such a situation constitutes appearance of the accused and he can perform all the acts and discharge ail the dutie