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1983 Supreme(Del) 136

High Court Of Delhi
AUROBINDO MUKERJI - Appellant
Versus
S.G.DAS - Respondent
Decided On : 04/27/1983

A tenant cannot rely on his own negligence or inaction to seek relief from an eviction order under the inherent powers of the Controller.

Headnote:

DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT, 1958 - SECTION 14(1)(E), 25B - EVICTION - SERVICE OF SUMMONS - DELAY IN FILING APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO DEFEND - INHERENT POWERS OF CONTROLLER - EXERCISE OF.

Fact of the Case:

Petitioner, a tenant, challenged an eviction order passed against him under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. He argued that he was not duly served with the summons and that his application for leave to defend was delayed due to his illness.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the petitioner was duly served with the summons by registered post and in ordinary course. It held that the petitioner's self-serving affidavit regarding his illness was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity of judicial acts and common course of business.

Issues: 1. Whether the petitioner was duly served with the summons? 2. Whether the petitioner's delay in filing an application for leave to defend was justified due to his illness? 3. Whether the Controller could exercise inherent powers to set aside the eviction order?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the petitioner was duly served with the summons by registered post and in ordinary course. It relied on the presumption of regularity of judicial acts and common course of business to infer that the petitioner received the complete copy of the eviction petition, including the annexure containing the grounds of eviction. 2. The court found that the petitioner's evidence regarding his illness was not satisfactory. It noted that the medical certificates did not state that the petitioner was unable to move or talk to his counsel or give instructions to him. 3. The court held that the Controller could not exercise inherent powers to set aside the eviction order because the petitioner was guilty of negligence and inaction in not filing the application for leave to defend within the prescribed time.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the revision petition and upheld the eviction order.

G. C. Jain, J.

( 1 ) THIS is a petition by the tenant under Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short the Act ) against the order of the Additional Controller dated August 10, 1982.

( 2 ) THE petitioner, Aurobindo Mukerji, is in occupation of entire house No. D-587, Chittaranjan Park, New Delhi, as a tenant under the respondent, S. G. Das. On February 16, 1982 the respondent filed a petition under proviso (e) to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 read with Section 25b of the Act seeking eviction of the petitioner from the said premises. Summons were directed to be issued to the petitioner in the Form specified in the Third Schedule to the Act by ordinary process as well as registered post. The registered envelope was served on the petitioner on March 27, 1982. He was served by ordinary process on April 13, 1982.

( 3 ) ON April 12, 1982 the petitioner filed an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure staling that on March 27, 1982 he had received an envelope by registered post containing summons and a copy of the application, without the copy of the annexure to the application, which contained the grounds of eviction or the copy of the plan referred to in para 8 of the application. He kept waiting for getting the copy of the annexure but did not receive the same and was in the circumstances unable to file any affidavit or application seeking leave to defend and that fifteen days time for making the said application could be reckoned only from the date of the service of the copy of the annexure and the site plan. This application was supported by an affidavit of the petitioner. Notice of this application was issued to the respondent who did not file any reply.

( 4 ) ON May 19, 1982 the petitioner filed an application under Section 25b of the Act seeking leave to defend. In para 9 of the affidavit annexed to this application the plcas taken in the application dated April 12, 1982 were reiterated. In para 10 it was stated that he suffered from fever on April 19, 1982 and was confined to bed and was unable to move about and could not meet his counsel to engage him in the case. On April 26, 1982 the attending Doctor diagonised that he was suffering from enteric fever and advised complete rest in bed for fourteen days. He had a relapse thereafter and had to remain confined to bed under medical advice upto the date of the application. On account of illness he was unable to meet his counsel or engage him and thus he could not file the application for leave to defend in time.

( 5 ) THE learned Additional Controller vide his impugned order disbelieving the contentions of the petitioner held that the petitioner had been duly served and he had failed to mike an application for leave to defend within fifteen days of the service of the summons. Consequently, he granted the eviction order under proviso (e) to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act in favour of the respondent against the petitioner who was allowed six months time to vacate the premises. The petitioner assails this order in this petition.

( 6 ) ADMITTEDLY an application under Section 25-B (4) of the Act seeking leave to defend is required to be made within fifteen days of the service of the summons A Division Bench of this Court in Jagdish Perahad v. Phoolwati Devi, XVIT (1980) D. L. T. 446 has held that the delay in making the application for leave to defend cannot be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The said period could not be extended. However, the eviction order passed could be set aside by applying the analogy of Order 37 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Similar view was taken by a learned single Judge of this Court in Gurditta Mal v. Bal Swarup, XVH (1980) D. L. T. 172. The relevant observations at page 220 read as under :-

"where is the power to be found for the Controller to do justice in such a case ? The Controller is not a court. He is tribunal. The tribunal has an inherent power to recall or vacate any ord










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