the port here the goods are to be landed. Section150 provided that wherever on the levying of any duty forany purpose it becomes necessary to determine the precisetime of importation of any goods if made by sea it shall bedeemed to have been completed from the time the vessel inwhich such goods were imported came within the limits ofthe port at which they ought to be reported. The importermaintained that as ship had reported on 29th April 1895, (before 2nd May) at North Sydney, Canada, no duty wasleviable, because importation was complete on 29th April. 9 HCD/83 31895. This plea of the company was rejected by the Privycouncil. It posed a question as to whether the sugar wasimported before or after 3-5-1895. Their Lordships madethe following observation on the phrase "imported intocanada":

" (1) The imposition of the duties is contained onlyin the direction for their payment. There are nowords which render the goods liable for theduty or make the duty (as it said) attach at anydate prior to the date of payment. (2) The words"when such goods are imported into Canada"express the time at which the duties are to bepaid. "their lordships also further emphasised.

"the result is that, in the opinion of their Lordships,the words "imported into Canada" must, in orderto give any rational sense to the clause, meanimported at the port of discharge, and cannot beused in the sense attributed to the words "imported"by the appellants, in accordance withthe construction placed by them on the definitionin s. 150 of the Customs Act. "-

( 25 ) REFERENCE with advantage be also made to Wilson v. Chambers and Company Proprietary Ltd. (1926) 38 C. L. R. 131 (14 ). In that case the company was the consignee of paintship from England which was sent to Sydney (Australia ). Ship arrived at port Kembla which was a proclaimed portand a custom officer was in attendance there. One Chamberspurchased the paint while it was on ship and thereafter the: ship left the port but without paying duty. Chambers wascharged with offences for failing to enter the goods and forevading payment of duty. Section 68 of the Customs Actprovided that all imported goods shall be entered either forhome consumption or for warehousing or for transhipment. The question was whether the goods were imported withinthe meaning of the section. It was admitted case that the shipcame to port and the only reason given why the goods werenot landed was because Chambers had agreed, while theship was in the port, to sell them to the owner of the ship. The argument was that as goods had not been taken off theship there was no import. This plea was rejected, thoughchief Justice Knox agreed (page 136) that goods are importedwhenever they are brought into port for the purpose ofbeing discharged there. But he held that goods had come atthe port of destination and their character of importationcannot be affected merely because the goods had been. soldwhile on the ship. That entering merely the territorial limitswould not amount to import was said by Starke J. when heobserved:

"they may be imported by means of a ship or aircraftor through the post (cf. sees. 49 and 35 ). Theymay be brought within the territorial limits ofaustralia, and may indeed be subject to Customcontrol and yet not be "imported" in the fiscalsense of the term. Thus goods shipped fromengland to New Zealand via Australia are notimported into Australia because in the courseof her voyage the ship with the goods on boardcomes within the territorial limits of Australiafor commercial purposes. Yet such goods wouldbe subject to the control of the Customs (Customs Act. sec. 31 ). Again goods comingashore from wrecks could hardly be clayed asimported goods, and the Customs Act has madespecial provisions to meet the case (vide sees. 65, 66, 67 and 148 ). "

( 26 ) REFERENCE to the Australian cases noted in Shriramlingamills v. Assistant Collector of Customs (1983)E. L. T. page 65 and 70 (15), is of great help where Gibbs J. was quoted as having held

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