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1982 Supreme(Del) 256

High Court Of Delhi
KAMAL OIL AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED - Appellant
Versus
KAMAL OIL AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED - Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL 253 of 1979
Decided On : 09/10/1982

Advocates Appeared:
A.K.Malhotra, D.S.Sawhney, LAXMI GROVER, R.N.MITTAL

The time limit of 10 days prescribed in Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for making an application for a second opinion from the Director, Central Food Laboratory is mandatory and cannot be extended by the court.

Headnote:

PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT, 1954 - SECTION 13(2) - APPLICATION FOR SECOND OPINION - TIME LIMIT - DELAY - EXPLANATION - SECTION 243 - SUMMONING OF DIRECTOR, CENTRAL FOOD LABORATORY AS EXPERT - SECTION 311 - POWER OF COURT TO SUMMON WITNESS AT ANY STAGE - JUST DECISION OF CASE.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a dealer in edible oil, was accused of misbranding rape-seed oil as groundnut oil. A sample of the oil was taken by a Food Inspector and sent for analysis to the Public Analyst, who found it to be groundnut oil. The petitioner was informed of the result of the analysis and was given 10 days to apply to the court for a second opinion from the Director, Central Food Laboratory. The petitioner failed to make the application within the prescribed time limit and the trial court rejected his subsequent application as being delayed. The petitioner filed a revision petition challenging the trial court's order.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the time limit of 10 days prescribed in Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for making an application for a second opinion from the Director, Central Food Laboratory is mandatory and cannot be extended by the court. The court also held that the petitioner's explanation for the delay in making the application was not satisfactory. However, the court held that the petitioner was entitled to summon the Director, Central Food Laboratory as an expert witness under Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though he had failed to make an application under Section 13(2) of the Act. The court also held that the trial court had the power under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to summon the Director as a witness at any stage of the proceedings, if it considered it necessary for the just decision of the case.

Issues: 1. Whether the time limit of 10 days prescribed in Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for making an application for a second opinion from the Director, Central Food Laboratory is mandatory? 2. Whether the petitioner's explanation for the delay in making the application was satisfactory? 3. Whether the petitioner was entitled to summon the Director, Central Food Laboratory as an expert witness under Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though he had failed to make an application under Section 13(2) of the Act? 4. Whether the trial court had the power under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to summon the Director as a witness at any stage of the proceedings, if it considered it necessary for the just decision of the case?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The time limit of 10 days prescribed in Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for making an application for a second opinion from the Director, Central Food Laboratory is mandatory and cannot be extended by the court. This is because the provision is designed to ensure that there is virtually no loss of time and the accused can avail of the benefit of the option given to him by Section 13(2) at the earliest possible opportunity. 2. The petitioner's explanation for the delay in making the application was not satisfactory. The petitioner claimed that he did not receive the copy of the Public Analyst's report within the prescribed time limit, but the court found that the report was sent to him by registered post and that he had signed the acknowledgment receipt. 3. The petitioner was entitled to summon the Director, Central Food Laboratory as an expert witness under Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though he had failed to make an application under Section 13(2) of the Act. This is because the right to summon witnesses under Section 243 is a fundamental right of the accused and it is not affected by the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act. 4. The trial court had the power under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to summon the Director as a witness at any stage of the proceedings, if it considered it necessary for the just decision of the case. This is because Section 311 gives the court wide discretion to summon any person as a witness, even if that person has not been summoned by either party.

Final Decision: The court set aside the trial court's order rejecting the petitioner's application to send the second counter-part of the food sample to the Director, Central Food Laboratory for his expert opinion. The court directed the trial court to send the sample to the Director and to dispose of the case in accordance with law, keeping in view the court's observations.

J. D. Jain, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioner Karnal Oil and Allied Industries Private Limited is dealing in the trade of manufacture and sale of edible oil at B-29, Lawrence Road, New Delhi, On 23rd of May, 1977, Shri Kulwant Singh, Food Inspector, lifted a sample of rape-seed oil (refined) for analysis from Karnal Kishore) petitioner No. 2, under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (herein-after referred to as the Act ) and the Rules made thereunder. Kamal Kishore, petitioner, was allegedly found selling, exposing/storng for sale the said article of food as Managing Director on behalf of Petitioner No. I and the said sample was taken out of asealed tin containing 2 kgs. of rape-seed oil (refined), white-horse brand and petitioner No. I is alleged to be the manufacturer of the same. On analysis the Public Analyst found that it was not refined rape-seed oil and instead it was refined groundnut oil. A complaint dated 24th of February 1978 was thereupon instituted by the Assistant Municipal Prosecutor, Municipal Corporation of Delhi, against the petitioners for the offence of mis-branding. The Local (Health) Authority vide letter dated 1st March 1978, copy Ex. Public Witness 3/a, sent a copy of the report of the Public Analyst to the petitioners as required by Section 13 (2) of the Act and informed them that in case they wished the sample to be analysed by the Central Food Laboratory they may make an application to that effect to the Magistrate concerned within a period of ten days from the receipt of the said letter. Charge was framed against the petitioners on 21st August 1978. The prosecution evidence concluded on 5th of July 1979 and the petitioner was examined under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), on the next following day. Thereafter the petitioners adduced defence evidence which concluded on 26th of July 1979 and the case was adjourned for arguments. After part of the arguments had been heard, the petitioners moved an application dated 27th of September 1979 purporting to be under Section 13 (2) of the Act read with Section 243 of the Code. It was stated therein that the petitioners wanted to challenge the report of the Public Analyst and, therefore, a prayer was made that a counter-part of the sample in possession of the Local (Health) Authority be sent to the Director, Central Food Laboratory, for his certificate. It was urged that even though with the passage of time the sample oil might have under gone chemical changes but even then having regard to the allegation that the sample of rape-seed oil (refind) was found to be that of groundnut oil, it was still possible to perform qualitative analysis to determine whether the sample oil was rape-seed oil or groundnut oil. The application was opposed by the prosecution, inter alia, on the ground that the time limit of ten days prescribed for such an application under Section 13 (2) of the Act had expired long ago and that even the defence evidence had coucluded. So, the application was made only with a view to delay or delay or defeat the prosecution. The learned trial. Magistrate vide impugned order dated 25th October 1979 rejected the application holding that the same was not maintainable in view of the time limit prescribed by Section 13 (2) and that amounted to an abuse of the process of law.

( 2 ) THIS revision petition raises two legal questions of vital importance. The first question is whether after the expiry of the time limit of ten days as laid down in Section 13 (2) itself, an accused is entitled to ask for sending of the second counter-part of the sample of the food article in possession of the Local (Health) Authority to the Director, Central Food Laboratory for second opinion by way of certificate. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners precisely is that the limit of ten days prescribed by Section 13 (2) for the said purpose is merely directory and an accused is not debarred from






















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