( 51 ) IN clause (e) of the proviso to section 14 (1), the purpose of the Act is to weigh the respective needs of the landlord and the tenant, and resolve the conflict between them. It is only if the need of the landlord amounts to a bona fide requirement that the tenant is allowed to be evicted. The underlying idea is that the existing accommodation should be equitably distributed. Hence, if the need of the landlord is otherwise met, he cannot obtain an order for recovery of possession against the tenant. That is why the additional condition is stated in clause (e) that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Looking at the matter from the point of "view of the object sought to be attained by the Act, it cannot matter how the need of the landlord is met, provided only that it is, in fact, met.

( 52 ) THE question whether a landlord's need for accommodation is met is essentially a question of fact to be decided having regard to all the circumstances of a given case. I think, the true test is whether, on an overall and reasonable view, it can be said, that the landlord has suitable accommodation available for his use. In deciding this question one should certainly have regard to the fact that the landlord has no legal right to the other accommodation; but, that is only a factor and not the end of the matter. For instance, if a landlord has been residing with his father for decades, and there is no cogent reason for the discontinuance of that arrangement, I think, that in actuality the landlord's nead is met. He has other accommodation available for his use, though theoretically he can be turned out at any time. My answer would be the other way if it were shown that there had been an estrangement and the father had asked the son to fend for himself. So, it all depends on the facts. Similar reasoning and considerations would hold if the landlord happened to be a father living with his son.

( 53 ) IF one takes the view that unless the landlord has a legal right to the other accommodation he is not to be treated as having other reasonably suitable residential accommodation, very curious and unjust results would ensue which would totally undermine the object of the Act. I will give just two examples which I put to counsel in argument, and to which I received no satisfactory reply.

( 54 ) TAKE the case of a government servant who has been allotted residential premises by the Government. Although the normal assumption is that he will retain the accommodation so long as he remains in service, he does not have a legal right to the accommodation. Suppose he owns a house in which there is a tenant. Can he, at his whim, without any threat or fear of eviction from the accommodation allotted to him by Government, contend, that since he has no legal right to that accommodation he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation and is, therefore, entitled to evict the tenant ?

( 55 ) IF the argument of counsel for the landlords is right, this contention ought to succeed. But, it would reduce the Act to absurdity. Such a landlord, though actually in possession of other reasonably suitable residential accommodation with a reasonable security of tenure, could evict his tenant at his sweet will, whenever the fancy took him, on the pretext that he had no legal right to the accommodation in which he lived.

( 56 ) HAD such been the intention of the Act, there would have been no need to add section 14a by amendment in 1976. That section now gives to a. landlord, who has been allotted residential premises by the Government, the right to evict his tenant when he is required by the Government to vacate the allotted premises because he owns a residential accommodation in Delhi, If clause (e) is to be given the interpretation which counsel for the landlords suggests, then the type of landlord under consideration already had an absolute right to evict his tenant whenever he liked, and section 14a is both misconceiv

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