( 1 ) THIS second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 by the landlady has arisen out of the following circumstances.

( 2 ) THE appellant took on lease plot No. 6-B/3 Northern Extension Area, Rajindernagar, New Delhi for the purpose of constructing a residential house from the Delhi Improvement Trust, a body corporate under the United Provinces Town Improvement Act (Act VIII of 1919) as extended to Delhi in terms of the deed dated 8/11/1954. She constructed a residential house and clause 10 of the deed provides that she shall not use the said land for any purpose except for erection of a building to be used as residential bungalow. In 1959, she let out the said premises to the respondent for being used as club. The Delhi Improvent Trust is now succeeded by the. Delhi Development Authority under the Delhi Development Act, 1957. The misuser of the premises as a club contrary to clause 10 of the lease deed was objected to by the Delhi Development Authority by means of various notices. The notice dated 17/10/1963 issued by the Delhi Development Authority to the appellant required her to show cause why the lease be not determined for breach of its terms. The appellant served a notice dated 18/12/1963 upon the respondent requiring it to stop the misuser. It did not stop the misuser. The appellant on 28/2/1968 filed an application for eviction of the respondent under Section 14 (1) (k) of the Act. As the appellant herself had let out the premises for non-residential purposes contrary to the terms of the lease between by her and the authorities, the eviction application was dismissed on the principle of estoppel by the Additional Controller on 20/9/1969 and her appeal was also dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal byjudgment dated 27/8/1971 following the judgment in S. P. Arora vs. Ajit Singh, ILR (1970) II Delhi 130. This court following Smt. Uma Kumari vs. Jaswant Rai Chopra, 1960 P. L. R. 460 held that the landlord having herself let out the premises for a purpose contrary to the terms of his lease, was estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14 (1) (k) of the Act.

( 3 ) THE question : Whether a landlord who had himself let out the premises in violation of the terms of lease deed, was estopped from claiming eviction of her tenant under Section 14 (1) (k) of the Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand vs. Ram Rattan Bhanot, AIR 1973 S. C. 921 and it was held that the landlord was not estopped as there can be no estoppel against statute. The appellant on 24/8/1973 filed another petition for eviction out of which this appeal has arisen claiming respondent s eviction under Section 14 (!) (k) of the Act alleging that she served a notice dated 8/2/1973 requiring the respondent to stop the misuser and it, having failed to stop the misuser, is liable to be evicted. The Additional Controller on 10/9/1976 dismissed her application on the ground that a similar application filed by her previously was dismissed and that the previous judgment operated as res-judicata. The appeal before the Tribunal was also dismissed on 25/10/1979 on the same ground.

( 4 ) THE admitted facts are that the plot of land was taken on lease by the appellant from the Delhi Improvement Trust now succeeded by the Delhi Development Authority; the building erected thereon is to be used as a residential bungalow; she let out the premises in suit to the respondent for use as a club; a notice dated 8/2/1973 was served by her upon the respondent requiring it to stop the misuser of the premises. T crucial question for decision is whether the present eviction proceedings are barred is : by the doctrine of res judicata.

( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant submits that there is change in law by the judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court after the dismissal of previous eviction case, that the present eviction application is based on a cause of action different from the cause of action in the prev