( 1 ) THE respondent Shanti Devi is the owner of the disputed premises which were at one time in the occupation of the Nigerian Embassy for three years. They vacated them in 1972. These were then hired by the Hindustan Paper Corporation in 1975 for their office purposes. They vacated them after seven months. Then the premises were taken by the South Town School for 2/3 years in April, 1976. They had to vacate before expiry of their term as the School found some problem in regard to the bye-lane. In January, 1977 M/s Nanda Bros. Exports (P) Ltd. came in on a limited tenancy under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act ). An application was made by Shanti Devi on February 3, 1977 before the Addl. Rent Controller stating that the building in question was lying vacant and is not required by her for at least one year as she is living abroad and will require the said premises after one year. The Addl. Controller examined her attorney Brij Mohan, who stated that the premises were not required for the present as the owner is residing abroad and was not likely to return before one year. The premises were being let out for residential purposes. Gurdev Singh on behalf of the Nanda Bros. deposed that the statement of the attorney is correct and that he agreed to take the premises on rent on the condition that he will vacate them on or before the expiry of one year. The learned Addl. Controller then having regard to the facts stated in the petition and the statements of the parties granted permission under section 21 of the Act to rent out the rpremises for a limited period of one year. The appellant did not vacate the premises as agreed. The landlady filed an execution petition before the Addl. Controller for eviction.

( 2 ) THE learned Additional Controller by his order of February 8, 1980 accepted the petition and directed eviction of the appellant. An appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal failed.

( 3 ) IN this second appeal, the substantial question of law that is being canvassed is based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in 8. B. Noornah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, AIR 1980 S. C. 193. It was argued that the sanction was void and that being so, after the expiry of the limited period of one year, the appellant became a statutory tenant : Biswabani Pvt. Lid. v. Santosh Kumar Datta and others, AIR 1980 S. C. 226 and could not be asked to vacate the premises otherwise than under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act.

( 4 ) IT is nobody s case that the tenancy was collusive or fraudulent or that if the permission is held to be void the tenancy will fall through The argument of Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee for the appellant is that the permission of the Addl. Controller was bad in law because the conditions stated therein were not satisfied. It was the duty of the Addl. Controller to have satisfied himself before granting permission that the conditions stated in the section were fulfilled. He invited my attention to paragraph 16 of S. B. Noronah (Supra) :

"what, then, are those conditions and safeguards? The first condition is that the landlord does not require the demised premises "for a particular period" only. This means that he must indicate to the authority before which sanction is sought for letting what is the particular period for which he can spare the accommodation. The Controller must be satisfied that the landlord means what he says and it is not a case of his not requiring the property indefinitely as distinguished from a specific or particular limited period of say one year, two years or five years. If a man has a house available for letting for an indefinite period and he so lets it, even if he specifies as a pretense, a period or term in the lease, Section 21 cannot be attracted. On the other hand, if he gives a special reason why he can let out only for a limited period and requires the building at the end of that period, such as that he expects to retire by then or that he is going on