( 1 ) THIS civil revision under Section 25b (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act ii directed against the order of the Rent Controller dated 27th September, 1980 whereby the petitioner-tenant was granted leave to defend the eviction application to a limited extent. The learned counsel for petitioner submits that he is entitled to be granted leave to defend on all the points. The learned counsel for respondents raises preliminary objection that revision against an interlocutory order passed under Sectn 25b of the Act is not maintainable under Section 25b (8) of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner however, submits that every order passed by the Controller under Section 25b of the Act is revisable within the meaning sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act. He relies upon Vinod Kumar Chowdhry v. Smt. Narain Devi Taneja, AIR1980 SC 2012 = 1980 DRJ 15. In the case before the Supreme Court the landlord s application for eviction was dismissed by the Controller. The landlord filed a revision in this Court and tenant submitted that the order dismissing the eviction application was appealable and not revisable but it was held by this Court that the remedy of the landlord was by way of revision and revision only under Section 25b (8) of the Act. The tenant went in appeal to the Supreme Court and it was held that the remedy of a landlord or tenant against an order dismissing or accepting an application for eviction was only by way of revision under Section 25b (8) of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the following observation in para 5 of the said judgment :

"the sub-section further provides however for the remedy of revision by High Court of any order made by the Controller under Section 25b, a remedy which is not available to party in a dispute not covered by Chapter- IIIA".

( 2 ) HE also relies upon the following observation made in para 6 by Supreme Court:

"the proviso to that sub-section gives power to the High Court to revise "an order made by the Controller under this section" which expression is no doubt capable of being construed as any order of whatsoever nature passed by Controller while acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 25b. The proviso, however, has to be read as a legislative measure carved out of the sub-section to which it is appended and the order mentioned therein has to be regarded as an order of type which the sub-section speaks of, i. e. , "an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this section". (Emphasis added ).

( 3 ) THE learned counsel lays stress on the word any used in the judgment as reproduced above. The Supreme Court while interpreting sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act has observed that the Expression "order for the recovery of possession of any premises" used in Section 25b (8) of the Aci, has it be construed, in the context in which it appears, as an order deciding an application for the recovery of possession of any premises. Thus, the Supreme Court held that an order for the recovery of possessions referred to in sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act means an order deciding the application for the eviction of tenant. This decision may be either by accepting or dismissing the eviction application. Thus the Supreme Court used the word any to mean that it was either an order accepting an eviction application or an order rejecting the same. Moreover sub-section (8) or its proviso does not speak of any order under Section 25b. Thus I am of the view that Section 25 (B) of the Act applies only to an order which is a final order either accepting or rejecting an application filed by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises against a tenant. It must, therefore, be held that no revision is maintainable against an interlecutory order passed by the Controller in an application for recovery of possession The Supreme Court in said