An employer cannot institute a fresh enquiry against an employee on the same charges which have been validly found by a Labour Court not to have been established or proved before a domestic enquiry.

( 1 ) IN this petition Sarvshri Prabhu Dayal, Jai Narain, Rohtas Singh and Mahavir Singh, employees of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, have challenged the orders dated 24th June, 1972 by which they were suspended from service and notices dated 22nd June, 1974. instituting a domestic enquiry against H them.

( 2 ) THE relevant facts are that the petitioners were working at the S. P. Mukherjee Marg Fire Station of the Delhi Fire Service. On an allegation that they had assaulted the Station Officer of the Fire Station. The petitioners were charge-sheeted and the enquiry was entrusted to the Director of Enquiries. The said Director found that the charges levelled were established and based on this finding the management dismissed the petitioners from service. The petitioners challenged the dismissal and an industrial dispute relating to the same was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. In this award, the Labour Court held that the findings of the Enquiry Officer at domestic enquiry were based on conjectures, hearsay evidence and suspicion and were perverse. He held that the order of removal of the workmen based on such findings was not sustainable directed their reinstatement with continuity of service. The management agitated the matter before the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. By judgment dated 7th January, 1972, Rajindar Sachair J. dismissed the petition as without merit and affirmed the award of the Labour Court. Against the said judgment the Municipal Corporation of Delhi preferred a Letters Patent Appeal. A Division Bench of this court consisting of V. S. Deshpande and S. Rangarajan JJ. dismissed the appeal on merits by judgment dated 9th May. 1972.

( 3 ) THE Letters Patent Appeal having been dismissed the respondent- corporation reinstated the petitioners in service with effect from 4th February, 1969 but by the same letter ordering their reinstatement dated 24th June, 1972, the Corporation purported to suspend them from service with effect from 4th February, 1969. This order of 24th June, 1972, referred to the Disciplinary Authority having decided to held a further enquiry against the petitioners on the same allegations and obviously the order of suspension was made in view of the aforesaid decision to hold a further enquiry.

( 4 ) TWO years later by a memorandum dated 22nd June. 1974. the Corporation informed the petitioners that it was proposed to proceed against them under Regulation 8 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Fire Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959.

( 5 ) THE petitioners. have challenged the orders of suspension and institution of a fresh enquiry into the same allegations in this writ petition.

( 6 ) THE first question for consideration is whether the respondent- corporation can institute a fresh enquiry against the petitioners on the same charges which were enquired into by the Director of Enquiries resulting in his findings of guilty, which finding was quashed by the Labour Court by its award dated 22nd February, 1974.

( 7 ) IT is relevant to recall here that the finding of the Director of Enquiries was quashed not on any preliminary objections based on denial of the audi alteram partem principle but on merits. The Labour Court held:

". . . . . . . . . . . . In the instant case as I have stated above the Enquiry Officer recorded his findings on the basis of hearsay evidence though the direct evidence was available. The findings in the present case were based on conjectures and hearsay evidence and on suspicion. The circumstantial evidence also did not connect before concerned workmen with the commission of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . "

( 8 ) AFTER the Labour Court has set aside the findings of the Enquiry Officer by holding that the verdict of guilty was not based on evidence but on conjectures, hearsay evidence and suspicion and if the view has been affirmed by the Single Bench and then Let