High Court Of Delhi
G.L.MIRCHANDANI - Appellant
Versus
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA. - Respondent
Civil 1738 of 1979
Decided On : 03/12/1980
PUBLIC PREMISES (EVICTION OF UNAUTHORISED OCCUPANTS) ACT, 1971 - JURISDICTION OF ESTATE OFFICER - DEFINITION OF "PUBLIC PREMISES" - INTERPRETATION - RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT, 1958 AND PUBLIC PREMISES (EVICTION OF UNAUTHORISED OCCUPANTS) ACT, 1971 - HARMONIOUS INTERPRETATION - JURISDICTION OF ESTATE OFFICER NOT TAKEN AWAY BY DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, a tenant of respondent No. 1, challenged the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer acting under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, in issuing a show cause notice for eviction. The petitioner contended that the definition of "public premises" in the Act was unconstitutional and that the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, was the exclusive law governing eviction of tenants.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the definition of "public premises" in the Act was constitutional and that the Act applied to the Union Territory of Delhi. The court also held that the Delhi Rent Control Act and the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act could be harmoniously interpreted and that the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer was not taken away by the Delhi Rent Control Act.
Issues: 1. Whether the definition of "public premises" in the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, was unconstitutional. 2. Whether the Act applied to the Union Territory of Delhi. 3. Whether the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, was the exclusive law governing eviction of tenants.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the definition of "public premises" in the Act was constitutional because Parliament had full competence to legislate on the subject of public premises in the Union Territory of Delhi. 2. The court held that the Act applied to the Union Territory of Delhi because the definition of "public premises" in the Act was one continuous definition and sub-sections (1) and (2) had to be read cumulatively and not disjunctively. 3. The court held that the Delhi Rent Control Act and the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act could be harmoniously interpreted and that the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer was not taken away by the Delhi Rent Control Act because each statute was available for initiating proceedings appropriate to the particular cause of action.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the writ petition and held that the Estate Officer had jurisdiction to issue the show cause notice to the petitioner.
( 1 ) THE petitioner is a tenant of respondent No. 1. The jurisdiction of the Estate Officer acting under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants), Act, 1971, in issuing the show cause notice to the petitioner, dated 1st March, 1979, is challenged in this writ petition. For the purpose of determining the said jurisdiction a proper construction of the definition of "public premises" in section 2 (e) of the said Act is necessary. Section 2 (e) is as follows :
" (E) public premises means and premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes ( I ) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by or on behalf of (i) any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty-one per cent, of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government; and (ii) any Corporation (not being a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, or a local authority) , established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government; and (2) in relation to the Union territory of Delhi (i) any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi or any municipal committee or notified area committee; and (ii) any premises belonging to Delhi Development Authority whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out by, the said Authority. "
( 2 ) SHRI V. S. Desai, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged the following contentions as to the construction of this definition of "public premises. "
(1) The Act is apparently enacted in exercise of the power of Parliament given by Entry 32 List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which is as follows: "property of the Union and the revenue therefrom, hut as regards property situated in a State subject to legislation by the State, save in so far as Parliament by law otherwise provide. " The expression "property of the Union" cannot include the property of a statutory Corporation, like respondent No. 1, even though it may be entirely financed by the Central Government. The Act cannot thus apply to the property of a statutory Corporation and for that reason the definition of "public premises" in so far as it purports in section 2 (2) (1) (ii) to include the premises belonging to a statutory Corporation established by or under a Central Act and under or controlled by the Central Government is unconstitutional. (2) The definition of "public premises" has two parts, sub-section (1) and sub-section (2 ). It is submitted that. . only the second part of the definition in sub-section (2) applies to the Union Territory of Delhi and since it does not include premises which belong to a statutory Corporation like respondent No. 1 the said Act does not apply to the present premises which are situated in the Union Territory of Delhi. (3) The relationship between the petitioner and respondent No. I is that of tenant and landlord. The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is a complete Code dealing with the eviction of a tenant by a landlord. In section 3 of the said Act an exception is made in favour of the premises belonging to the Government but not in favour of the premises belonging to a statutory Corporation. The exclusive jurisdiction of the Controller under the Delhi Rent Control Act cannot be infringed upon by the Estate Officer acting under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
( 3 ) THESE contentions have been traversed in the counter-affidavit where reference is also made to the merits of the case as to whether the tenant-petitioner has or has not contravened the terms of the lease and the prohibition contained in the lease of the land held by respondent No. 1 from the lessor. We have entertained the writ. petition only because of the constitutional and legal contentions urged by the petitioner as set out above. As for the merits of the question, whether on the proper interpretation of t
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