( 1 ) THIS is tenant s appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called "the Act") against the judgment and order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 26th April, 1979 by which it accepted the landlady s appeal from the order of the Additional Controller dated 10/2/1975 and passed an order of eviction against the appellants. The landlady-respondent brought an eviction petition on grounds mentioned in clauses (a), (e) and (b) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. The Additional Controller dismissed the eviction petition. The landlady filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The order of the Controller was set aside and an eviction order undersection 14 (1) (e) of the Act was passed on 26th April, 1979. The learned counsel for the appellants raises three questions in this appeal: 1. The eviction application does not disclose any cause of action.

( 2 ) THE premises were not let for residential purposes but were let and used both for residential and commercial purposes.

( 3 ) THE landlady does not require bonafide the demised premises and she has suitable accommodation on first floor. The learned counsel for the landlady in reply submits that the tenant, neither raised any plea in the written statement that the eviction petition did not disclose any cause of action, nor such an objection was ever argued either before the Controller or the Rent Control Tribunal. He further submits that such an objection cannot be allowed to be urged in second appeal because the respondent had no notice previously and if an objection had been taken in the first instance, the respondent could have removed the objection, by amendment of pleadings or otherwise. He further says that the appellants never raised any objection at the time of recording of evidence, that evidence on all the ingredients of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act has been recorded at the instance of both the parties and the appellants have always been aware of the case set up by the landlady under clause 14 (1) (e) of the Act. He further submits that no appeal lies as no substantial question of law is involved. On merits, he submits that the premises were let out for residential purposes alone in accordance with the rent notes executed by the predecessors of the appellants, that the landlady bonafide requires the suit premises and that she has no other reasonably suitable accommodation.

( 4 ) FOR deciding the question involved in this appeal the relevant facts are: Thakur Dass, predecessors of the appellants was the owner of the suit property He was father of Kundan Lal and Roshan Lal. Kundan Lal was the predecessor of appellants No. 1 to 5. Thakur Dass on 3/6/1942 sold the suit: property to one Pyare Lal by means of the sale deed Ex. AX/4. He and his son Kundan Lal attorned to Pyare Lal and executed two rent notes Ex. AX/1 and Ex. AX/2, on 3/6/1942. By these rent notes the premises now in dispute were taken on rent by Thakur Dass and Kundan Lal for their own residence Pyare Lal sold this property to Jawainda Mal by means of a registered sale deed dated 24/10/1943. Jawainda Mal executed a release deed dated 28/1/1947 with respect to the suit property and his other proper ies in favour of his daughter-respondent-landlady who thus became owner of the property. The respondent s husband is R. N. Chadha. It appears that the respondent s husband suffered an attack of Coronary Thrombosis with acute myocardial infraction on 23/11/1964 and he was hospitalised for about three weeks at Sir Ganga Ram Hospital. He was advised by the doctors that it was inadvisable for him to climb stairs. It may be mentioned that the respondent landlady with her husband has been in occupation of the first floor of the suit premises. She accordingly filed a petition under Section 9 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 and the Competent Authority by order dated 5th April, 1966 granted the permission. In pursuence of this permission the