The mode of execution of a decree for permanent injunction is specifically provided for in O. 21, R. 32 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that no resort can be had to the inherent powers of the Court.

( 1 ) THIS revision petition is directed against the ex parte order of the executing court dated 31st August, 1979 ordering the issue of warrants of possession of the property in dispute.

( 2 ) IT appears that the respondent No. 1, Mulakh Raj, filed a suit for a decree for permanent injunction restraining petitioner, Sunder Das and one Bishamber Lal from interfering with his possession in relation to plots Nos. 32, 33 and 35, Wazir Nagar, Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi. The suit of Shri Mulakh Raj was decreed on 27th January, 1971 and a decree for permanent injunction was granted in his favour.

( 3 ) IN spite of the decree, the petitioner and Bishamber Lal disobeyed the decree and Mulakh Raj was dispossessed from the aforesaid property.

( 4 ) MULAKH Raj then applied for execution on the terms contained in O. 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of the application of the decree-holder both Sunder Dass and Bishamber Lal were ordered to be detained in civil prison.

( 5 ) THE appeal of the judgment-debtors against their detention in civil prison failed and this court by order dated 23rd May, 1974 dismissed the Execution Second Appeal on behalf of the judgment-debtors (E. S. A. 19/1973 ).

( 6 ) THE result of the aforesaid execution appeal was that the appeal was dismissed but the period of detention was reduced to six weeks.

( 7 ) IT appears that on 31-8-1975, practically eight years after the decree, the decree-holder made an application purporting to be under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating inter alia, "that the judgment-debtors have taken unauthorised possession of the premises in suit that application is being moved under Section 151 of C. P. C. submitting before this Hon ble Court that this Hon ble Court may be pleased to issue warrants of possession against the judgment-debtors under the inherent powers and even the orders be made to put the decree-holder in possession".

( 8 ) THEREAFTER the impugned order dated 31st August, 1979 was passed by the executing Court ordering the issue of warrants of possession of the property in dispute.

( 9 ) MR. Rawal, who appears for Sunder Das, judgment-debtor, has contended that the mode of execution of decree for permanent injunction is provided for in Order 21, Rule 32 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and since there is no decree for delivery of immovable property no orders could be passed for issue of warrants of possession. In support of his submission, learned counsel tor the judgment-debtor relief on the Full Bench decision of this Court reported as AIR 1972 Delhi 142. Sarup Singh v. Daryodhan Singh.

( 10 ) IT is true that the decree in that case was for mandatory injunction. The observations of the Full Bench in paragraphs 9 and 10 are relevant and are reproduced below:

"9. The learned counsel for the respondent has lastly urged that the Court cannot allow its decree to be disobeyed contumaciously and it must device some procedure under Clause (e) of Section 51 of the Code and in exercise of the said power, the execution court must use force to compel the judgment-debtor to vacate the premises. Clause (e) contains a residuary provision which comes into play where the decree in question cannot be executed according to clauses (a) to (d) or any other provision of law. Section 51 itself begins with the qualifying phrase "subject to such conditions and limitation" as may be prescribed, that is to say prescribed by statutory rules of the Code as denned by Section 2. This clause came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Murari Lal v. Nawal Kishore, AIR 1961 Punj 547, where S. S. Dulat and D. K. Mahajan, JJ. followed a Full Bench authority of the High Court of Allahabad, Anandi Lal v. Ram Sarup, AIR 1936 All 495 and observed that all the various modes mentioned in Section 51 were not open to an execution Court in every case and it was to be guided by the procedure laid down in the s