The Rent Controller has the power to restrict the leave application to certain grounds and the order granting leave to the tenant cannot be challenged in revision under Section 25B(8) of the Act.

( 1 ) THIS is a petition for revision against the order of the Rent Controller dated 18. 9. 1978 granting leave under section 25 B (5) of the Rent control Act but limited to one ground only.

( 2 ) THE respondent/landlord filed an application claiming eviction on the ground of bona fide need. The petitioner/tenant sought leave to defend on various grounds namely about the lack of ownership of the landlord, lack of bonafide need and also denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and also claiming that no notice of termination had been validly served. The Rent Controller found no merit in all the grounds excepting the ground relating to termination of tenancy and granted leave with respect to that ground only. The tenant has come up to this court in revision against that order.

( 3 ) IN restricting the leave to one ground the trial court relied on a decision given by me which is reported as Jiteiidre Verma v. Manohar Lal Aggarwal (1978) (1) RCR 203 ). At the time of admission Mr. Sahai had referred to Smt. Kundan Kaur v. K. P. Verma (1978) (2) R. C. R. 282) and contended that this authority seems to take a contrary view. I have gone through this authority. In that case leave to contest had been refused. The tenant had come up in revision and the learned Judge had come to a finding that leave should be granted, on a restricted point. The further question that was decided was that leave to defend should not be allowed on the ground of purpose of letting or about the ownership of the landlord as the same had not been dispute in the application for leave to defend. The learned judge accepted this contention and held that the leave will not be granted on this question which had not been raised in the leave application. Referring to M/s. Viraj Lal Muni Lal and Co. s case decided by me in (1978 (1) RCR 231), the learned judge accepted that this court in revision could restrict the leave application to certain grounds and it was not mandatory that the leave must be given on all the grounds raised by the tenant. No doubt there is small observation to the effect that there can be no doubt that so far as the Controller is concerned once leave to defend eviction petition is granted by him the tenant cannot be restricted to a particular pleas, but it appears to me with respect that this is more in the nature of obiter because this point was not before the learned judge. Moreover even the counsel for the petitioner did not seriously urge that if this court, is to be held to have power to restrict the leave application to certain grounds there can not be any distinction with respect to the powers of the Rent Controller. That is why he sought to contend that neither the Rent Controller nor this court can restrict the grounds on which the leave can be granted. Mr. Sahai s argument was that Section 25 B (5) provides for leave to be granted to the tenant and therefore once the court has come to a finding that the case is such where the leave should be granted it is not within the province of the court to restrict the leave application to a particular ground. He seeks to invoke the principle of Order 37 Civil Procedure Code and urges that it cannot be accepted that under October 37 Civil Procedure Code when leave to defend is granted the same can be restricted to a particular item. In that connection he relied on Lachman Singh v. C. D. Taneja etc. (1974 Rajdhani Law Reporter 80 ). In that case a suit had been brought on the basis of a pronote claiming Rs. 4,000. 00. The defendant had alleged that he had made various payment and the trial court accepted that plea of payment of Rs. 1625. 00. The court was satisfied with regard to the payment of Rs. 550. 00 and not with the rest of the amount and therefore decreed the suit to the extent of Rs. 2375. 00 and granted leave to defend in respect of the balance of the amount This course was disapproved by Misra J. who held that the jurisdiction of the court consisted in refusing leave or