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1979 Supreme(Del) 151

High Court Of Delhi
KRISHAN MURGAI - Appellant
Versus
SUPERINTENDENCE COMPANY OF INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED - Respondent
First Appeal Order 86 of 1979
Decided On : 07/20/1979

Advocates Appeared:
D.N.Sawhney, G.L.SANGHI, L.K.PANDEY, L.M.SINGHVI, N.D.GARG, RAJIV GEORGE, S.C.Dhanda, V.Rao

Post-service restrictive covenants are prima facie void and unenforceable under Section 27 of the Contract Act, 1872, unless they fall within one of the exceptions specified in the statute.

Headnote:

CONTRACT - RESTRAINT OF TRADE - SECTION 27 OF THE CONTRACT ACT, 1872 - VALIDITY OF POST-SERVICE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS - REASONABLENESS OF RESTRAINTS - PROTECTION OF EMPLOYER'S INTERESTS - TRADE SECRETS - TRADE CONNECTIONS - INTERPRETATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff, a company engaged in inspecting merchandise for quality assessment, sought a permanent injunction against the defendant, a former employee, to restrain him from carrying on a similar business after the termination of his employment. The defendant had agreed to various terms in his employment contract, including a two-year non-compete clause and a prohibition against revealing trade secrets.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the post-service restrictive covenants imposed on the defendant were void and unenforceable under Section 27 of the Contract Act, 1872. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction, as there was no evidence of any trade secrets or confidential information being imparted to the defendant during his employment.

Issues: 1. Whether the post-service restrictive covenants imposed on the defendant were valid and enforceable under Section 27 of the Contract Act, 1872. 2. Whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted Section 27 of the Contract Act, 1872, as imposing an absolute prohibition on post-service restrictive covenants, subject to certain exceptions specified in the statute. The court held that the exceptions to the rule against restraint of trade were exhaustive and could not be expanded by judicial interpretation. 2. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to plead and prove any facts to establish that the defendant had acquired any trade secrets or confidential information during his employment that could justify the imposition of a post-service restrictive covenant. 3. The court also held that the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant had any influence over the plaintiff's customers or clients that could justify a restraint on his ability to compete with the plaintiff after the termination of his employment.

Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal and vacated the temporary injunction granted by the trial court.

V. S. DESHPANDE

( 1 ) "you cannot", they say, "have the cake and eat it too". But a plaintiff who obtains a temporary injunction against a defendant eats the cake even before getting it. It is obvious, therefore, that temporary injunction, for instance, under Order XXXIX Rule 2 granted by the learned single Judge to the plaintiff respondent against the defendant appellant in this case can be justified only if it was based on a good prima facie case made out by the plaintiff showing that in all probability the plaintiff was entitled to obtain ultimately the permanent injunction sought by it as could appear at this stage before going into evidence from the pleadings and the admitted documents. The appellant contends that no prima facie case was made out by the respondent and the temporary injunction should be vacated in the appeal. We must, therefore, first see the facts and the pleadings, and the law applicable on such facts to know if a good prima facie case was made out to justify the grant of temporary injunction. THE FACTS:

( 2 ) THE plaintiff carries on business of inspecting merchandise with a view to assess their quality and claims that it has established reputation and goodwill in its business, developed its own technique for quality testing and control, and possesses trade secrets in the form of these techniques and clientele. The plaintiff has been employing various persons as Manager and in other capacities in Calcutta, New Delhi and other places. The employees are put in posts of trust and confidence sharing the secrets of business and trade of the plaintiff.

( 3 ) THE defendant was employed by the plaintiff on 27th March, 1971. During his service the defendant appellant was given various positions including that of the Manager of the New Delhi branch of the plaintiff. The relevant terms in the appointment letter of the defendant are:

"9. that while in our employ, you will not be permitted to engage yourself in any part time job. 10. that you will not be permitted to join any firm of our competitors or run a business of your own in similar lines directly and/or indirectly, for a period of two years at the place of your last posting after you leave the company. 11. that no secrets of the company must be revealed to other parties and that you will not commit any sort of misdemeanours which may cause harm of any sort to the organisation. "the defendant accepted these terms. He served a probationary period and was confirmed. On 24th November, 1978 the plaintiff terminated the defendant s services with effect from 27th December, 1978. "

( 4 ) AFTER the termination of the service the defendant started carrying on business on lines identical with the business of the plaintiff under the name and style of "superintendence of Surveillance Inspectorate of India" in New Delhi, which was similar to the name of the plaintiff, which is "superintendence Company of India (P) Limited". The defendant was associating or joining with the competitors of the plaintiffs business. He was soliciting customers and business from the plaintiff s clientele and was also using and employing the technique of the plaintiff which he had learnt during his employment.

( 5 ) THE plaintiff brought the suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from his activities on the ground that these activities were contrary to terms 10, 11 and 12 of his employment. As to term 10 the plaintiff is said to have made a rule that an employee after leaving plaintiff s service was not (to) engage in a similar business for two years.

( 6 ) NORMALLY, the assessment whether a good prima facie case exists for granting temporary injunction is in the judicial discretion of the trial court and the court of appeal will not interfere if the judicial discretion is reasonably exercised. If, however, it appears that the fundamental condition for the grant of temporary injunction, namely a prima facie case, is itself not fulfilled, then the court of appeal will have to inte
































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