The word "himself" in proviso (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, should not be given a restricted meaning and can include the requirement of the landlord for the occupation of the premises by a person who is coming to live as a member of the family to fulfill the need of the landlord himself.

( 1 ) THIS is tenant s second appeal against the judgment of the courts below allowing the eviction application filed by the respondent- landlady. The respondent landlady, moved an application under clause (e) of proviso to subsection (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act ). It was pleaded that the tenant was occupying two rooms, bath and kitchen of the house while she was occupying the garage attached to which there was no kitchen, bath or store. She was not keeping good health and was alone, also there was no no place where her only child, daughter who is married and her son-in-law along with her grand children could come and live with her, and that she bona fide required them to live with her. This was countered by the appellant tenant who pleaded that the need was not bona fide

( 2 ) EARLIER an application for eviction was filed on 9. 6. 1964 claiming the possession of the suit property on the same ground, namely that the premises were required bona fide by the respondent landlady. However an agreement was arrived at between the parties and by deed of 1. 8. 1964 Ex. R. 2 the appellant tenant agreed to pay the rent of Rs. 40. 00 p. m. (it appears that prior to that the rent which had been fixed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property ; the property being evacuee, was Rs. 7. 00 ). As it had also been agreed and in purusance of that on an application filed by the respondent-landlady the eviction application was got dismissed for default on 20. 8. 1964. This was obviously in pursuance of the agreement whereby the landlady had agreed to withdraw the civil suit against the tenant.

( 3 ) AFTER the lapse of four years in March, 1968, the petitioner applied under the Slum Area (Improvement of Clearance) Act seeking permission to file eviction application against the appellant-tenant which permission was granted on 23. 5. 1969. The application for eviction was thereafter filed on 30. 5. 1969 but as there was a formal defect in the notice issued for termination of tenancy the same was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh one as per court order in July, 1971. Thereafter the present application out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed in December, 1971 seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide need. The courts below have found that the need of the respondent landlady was genuine and bona fide inasmuch as she wanted her son-in-law and his family to come and live with her. The courts below have found that the notice of termination of tenancy was sent by post and was also affixed on the premises of the appellant tenant. It cannot, therefore, be seriously contended that. the notice had not been served on the appellant tenant as had been contended in the courts below.

( 4 ) THE first contention of Mr. Yogeshwar Pershad, the learned counsel for the appellant is that the present application for eviction is barred on the principle of res-judicata. The argument being that as the earlier application filed in June, 1964, had been withdrawn in pursuance of an agreement on 1. 8. 1964 the present application for eviction is barred by the principle of re-judicata. I cannot agree. There was obviously no adjudication in the previous application filed in June, 164. No doubt as it appears from Ex. R. 2 the application was withdrawn on 20. 8. 64 in pursuance of the said agreement. But as there was no adjudication the question of any re-judicata cannot arise. Of course it is open to Mr. Yogeshwar Pershad to urge that the conduct of the respondent landlady in filing an application [and withdrawing it apparently when the rent was increased should be taken into account in determining whether her needs are genuine or not but that is an argument for determining the genuineness or the bona fide need of the applicant and not a bar of re-judicata in filing the present application in December, 1971. This pica, therefore, fails.

( 5 ) THE next argument urged by the counsel is that t