A claim petition under Section 446(2)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956, is maintainable for the recovery of money, and the fixed court fee of Rs. 13 is payable on such a petition.

( 1 ) COMPANY Appeal Nos. 2, 3,4 and 8 of 1969 have been placed before the full bench in view of the order of reference dated October 17, 1974 passed by S. N. Shankar, and T. P. S. Chawla, JJ.

( 2 ) THESE appeals arise out of the order dated 4-2-1969 passed by the learned Company Judge (S. N. Andley, J. as his Lordship then was) in Company Petition Nos. 70, 71, 68 and 69 of 1967 respectively. This order will dispose of all the four appeals as common question of law is involved.

( 3 ) THE facts of Company Petition 70 of 1967 alone are being stated here as they are sufficient to illustrate the common question of law arising in the aforesaid appeals.

( 4 ) MAJESTIC Finance Private Limited was ordered to be wound up by the order of the High Court of Punjab (Circuit Bench at Delhi) in Civil Original 31-D of 1964 by order dated 11-12-1964 passed by S. B. Capoor, J. The Official Liquidator filed a petition under section 446 (2) (b) of the Companies Act, on 14-6-1967 for the recovery of Rs. 1,11,866. 30 from three persons including Jaimal Singh Makin, the appellant before us in all the four appeals.

( 5 ) SIMILAR applications were filed against Jaimal Singh Makin and others by way of Company Petition Nos. 71, 68 and 69 of 1967.

( 6 ) JAIMAL Singh, the present appellant, R. Sen and Hargurchet Singh Kandola, who-were respondents in Company Petition Nos. 70 and 71 of 1967, were directors of the company in liquidation. Another Company Petition 68 of 1967 was also filed in which the aforesaid three persons were partners. The Official Liquidator had, in these petitions, claimed large amounts from several respondents on the basis of entries in the books of account of ,the company and in so far as at least the directors were concerned also on the basis of the statements made in the balance-sheet and profit and loss account of the company.

( 7 ) THE appellant resisted the said claim petition and raised preliminary objections against their adjudication by the learned Company Judge. The twin preliminary objections against the maintainability of the petitions filed on behalf of the Official Liquidator were :

(I) that the application was not competent as the Official Liquidator should have filed the suit and (ii) that the Court-fees on the petition should have been paid as upon a suit in accordance with Schedule I of the Court fees Act.

( 8 ) THE learned Company Judge framed various issues and, inter alia, treated issues I and 2 as preliminary issues which are as under:

(1) Is the application not competent on the ground that the Official Liquidator should have filed a suit? (2) Should Court-fees on the petition have been paid as upon a suit in accordance with Schedule I of the Court fees Act ?

( 9 ) THE learned Company Judge decided both the preliminary issues against the appellant and held that the petitions under Section 446 (2) (b) of the Companies Act were maintainable and the fixed Court-fee of Rs. l3 paid on the petition was proper and the petitions were not liable to be stamped under Schedule I of the Court-fees Act.

( 10 ) THE appellant filed the present appeals against the aforesaid decision of the learned Company Judge deciding the preliminary issues Nos. 1 and 2 against the appellant. These appeals, as stated earlier, have been placed before the Full Bench for disposal.

( 11 ) MR. P. C. Khanna, learned Counsel for the appellant, in support of the appeals made his submissions in this way :

( 12 ) THAT on a proper construction of Section 446 (2) of the Companies Act, it ought to have been held that no petition could be filed by way of a petition under section 446 (2) (b) of the Companies Act for the recovery of the amounts. The Official Liquidator could only have filed a suit. It was submitted that on a true construction of Section 446 (2) (a) it ought to have been held that clause (b) of Section 446 (2) applies and operates only in fields other than those covered by Section 446 (2) (a ). It was further submitted that the fact