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1975 Supreme(Del) 137

High Court Of Delhi
CHANDER BHAN - Appellant
Versus
NARSINGH DASS - Respondent
SECOND APPEAL 117 of 1974
Decided On : 08/05/1975

Advocates Appeared:
F.C.Bedi, L.R.GUPTA

The allotment of government accommodation to a government servant is not temporary unless there is a specific indication to the contrary in the terms of the allotment or the rules subject to which it is made.

Headnote:

EVICTION - ALLOTMENT OF GOVERNMENT ACCOMMODATION - TEMPORARY ALLOTMENT - AD HOC BASIS - OUT-OF-TURN ALLOTMENT - RIGHT OF HEARING IN APPEAL - DISMISSAL IN LIMINE - SUMMARY DISMISSAL - OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant, a government servant, was allotted government accommodation on an "ad hoc basis" due to his son's illness. He was later served with an eviction notice under Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, on the ground that he had been allotted alternative accommodation. The appellant challenged the eviction notice, arguing that the allotment was temporary and that the eviction was partial as the latrine in his occupation had been included.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the allotment of government accommodation to the appellant was not temporary and that the eviction was not partial. The court also held that the Rent Control Tribunal erred in dismissing the appellant's appeal in limine without giving him a proper hearing.

Issues: 1. Whether the allotment of government accommodation to the appellant was temporary? 2. Whether the eviction was partial? 3. Whether the Rent Control Tribunal erred in dismissing the appellant's appeal in limine?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the allotment of government accommodation to the appellant was not temporary because there was nothing in the allotment rules or otherwise to indicate that such an allotment was intended to be a temporary arrangement. The court also held that the dictionary meaning of the expression "ad hoc" does not support the appellant's contention that the allotment was temporary. 2. The court held that the eviction was not partial because the appellant had exclusive use of the latrine in his occupation. 3. The court held that the Rent Control Tribunal erred in dismissing the appellant's appeal in limine without giving him a proper hearing. The court held that the right of hearing at the appellate stage is not confined merely to the exercise of formulation of the points that arise. Such an exercise is only a preliminary step in the arguments. The right of hearing includes an opportunity to appropriately reinforcing the points that arise with appropriate arguments either with reference to the pleadings or evidence or the law including precedents.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal.

H. L. Anand

( 1 ) RESPONDENT had sued for eviction U/s 14 (1) (h) etc. Defence was that allotment was temporary and that is was a case of partial eviction as latrine in tenants occupation had been included. Landlord s case was that its user was not exclusive but comman. Tenant relied on some receipts in which latrine was mentioned. In 2nd appeal, it was held that for terms of tenancy Statement in rent receipt is not enough and more cogent proof was necessary. Para 6 onwards judgment is

( 2 ) IT was next contended that the allotment of a Government accommodation in favour of the appellant could not constitute a ground of eviction under Section H (1) (h) of the Act because the allotment was of a temporary nature intended to enable the appellant to have effective treatment of his son in the Safdarjang Hospital. Reliance for this contention was placed on Ex. Rl, which mentions that the accommodation in question had been sanctioned "on ad hoc basis on the ground of sickness of your son". Learned counsel for the appellant was, however, unable to show either with reference to the allotment rules or otherwise that such ad hoc allotment was intended to be a temporary arrangement. The dictionary meaning of the expression "ad hoc", on which reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant, does not fortify his contention either. According to Webster, "ad hoc" is for a "specific purpose" or "for the case only" meaning thereby that this was not intended to be a precedent for other cases but was an action taken in the peculiar circumstances of a particular case. The peculiar circumstances in which an allotment may be made to a Government servant are intended to justify an out-of-turn allotment but do not change the nature of the tenure or period for which the allotment would enure unless there is a specific indication to the contrary. SR. 317-B-9 of the Allotment of Government Residences, (General Pool in Delhi) Rules, 1963 provides for an out-of-turn allotment to public servant on ground of serious illness of self or member of the family. There is, however, nothing in the rules which may justify the conclusion that an "ad hoc" allotment or an out-of turn allotment once made is any different from ordinary allotment of Government accommodation to a public servant. Once a Government servant is allotted Government accommodation, in the absence of anything to the countrary in the terms of the allotment or the rules subject to which it is made, the Government servant is entitled to stay in the premises until his retirement, resignation or removal, as the case may be. This contention must, therefore, be rejected.

( 7 ) LASTLY, it was contended that, inasmuch as the Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the appeal in limine, there has been no proper hearing of the appeal. Shri Bedi pointed out that he had appeared at the preliminary hearing of the appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal and was asked to formulate the points that arose in the appeal and after he had done that, the same was dismissed in limine although a detailed order was drawn up subsequently with the result that the appellant had been denied the reasonable opportunity of being heard. If the appeal was dismissed in limine even though by a reasoned order which was drawn up subsequently merely after the counsel had formulated the questions that arose for consideration in the appeal, and I have no reason to doubt the correctness of the statement of Shri Bedi, the grievance of the appellant would be justified. The statutory right of appeal is a matter of some importance. It is virtually a rehearing of the original cause end the right of the appellant, as indeed the power of the First Appellate Court, are plenary in nature. If such an appeal raised either question of law or of fact which deserved consideration, it should not ordinarily be dismissed in limine even though a reasoned order may be drawn up subsequently. In the case of Mahade v Tukaram Vetale and others v. Smt. Sugandha and another

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