The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction.

( 1 ) IN a civil suit before High Court parties entered into a compromise on 19-8-71 and a decree was passed on 22-8-71. Decretal sum was agreed to be paid in instalments. After some payment there was default and D. H. applied for execution. J. D. s raised objections and claimed that the decree was passed by fraud. Issues were framed and the case was set down for recording of evidence. D. H. then made an application that decree cannot be questioned in execution proceedings and also that evidence was not necessary. After narrating above facts, judgement para 4 onwards is :

( 4 ) MR. R. L. Aggarwal, had contended that the objections under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure can only relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree ; in other words the question as to the correctness or validity of the decree cannot be gone into in execution proceedings. According to him, the question as to the validity of the decree is not one in execution, or about the discharge or satisfaction of the decree and can be gone into only by way of a separate suit and not in execution proceedings. However, an exception has been made, urged the counsel that the validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings when the ground is that the Court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction. The objections which impeach the decree itself, are not one relating to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Court. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel relied on Hira Lal Patni vs. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 1962, SC 199 wherein it was held :

". . . . . . THE validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seizein of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it. "reliance is also placed on A. Venkateseshayya v. A. Virayya AIR 1958 AP 1 (. . . . . .)

( 5 ) THE counsel contended that the objectors are not questioning the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in passing the decree in the suit; the challenge of the objectors is that the decree was obtained on the basis of the compromise dated August 19, 1972, which compromise was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud. These question do not. according to counsel, relate to the execution of the decree but relate to impeaching the decree itself.

( 6 ) MY enquiry in the present application is only limited to the question whether the judgment debtors can challenge in the execution proceedings, the validity of the decree passed on the basis of the compromise dated 19, 1972, on the ground that the compromise was obtained by making mis representation and hy playing fraud upon them. The general rule is that an Executing Court cannot go behind the decree, it must take the decree as it is and must proceed to execute it. It must take the decree according to its tenor ard cannot entertain any objection that the decree is incorrect in law or in facts. The function of the executing court is to enforce and execute the decree ard not to question its correctness, There is, however, a well established exception that if there was lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court which had passed the decree, then the decree is a nullity and the executing court has to refuse its execution. The Supreme Court in Hira Lal v. Sri Kali Nath s (supra) case had clearly laid down that the validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction was illustrated as when the court could not have seizin of the case because the subject matter was whol