1974 Supreme(Del) 32

High Court Of Delhi
HARI SHANKAR GUPTA - Appellant
Versus
UNION OF INDIA - Respondent
First Appeal (OS) 91 of 1969
Decided On : 02/08/1974

An order dismissing an application under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as barred by time did not amount to setting aside the Award within the meaning of the expression used in clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of Section 39 and was, therefore, not appealable under Section 39 of the Act.

Headnote:

ARBITRATION - Appeal - Maintainability - Order dismissing application under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as barred by time - Whether appealable under Section 39 of the Act or under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 or under clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant had entered into a contract with the Regional Director (Food), Northern Region, New Delhi for handling/transporting work at Central Storage Depot, Shahjahanpur. The contract contained an arbitration clause and pursuant to certain disputes that arose between the parties, the same were REFERRED TO to an Arbitrator in terms of the contract who, by an Award made on December 6, 1966 awarded a sum of Rs. 78. 212. 20 in favour of the appellant. On the same day, the Arbitrator issued a notice to the appellant and the Union of India, respondent herein, informing them that he had made and signed the Award on the same day. The notice added that "a signed copy of the award is enclosed herewith. The parties are authorised to file the signed copy in court on my behalf." On February 27. 1968 the appellant made an application to the Arbitrator requesting him to file the Award in Court so that it may be caused to be made a rule of the Court but the application of the appellant was turned down by the Arbitrator by his order of February 28,1968 on the ground that there was no justification to acceed to the request after a lapse of more than one year of the making of the Award. A review was then sought of the said order on April 17, 1968 in which it was prayed in the alternative that the appellant may be supplied with a signed copy of the Award as also a letter of authority authorising the appellant to file the Award in Court on behalf of the Arbitrator as the signed copy and the letter of authority given to the appellant earlier, when the Award was made and signed, was stated to have been lost and could not be traced. This application was dismissed of by an order made on April 18, 1968 by which while the prayer for review was. turned down, it was directed that a signed copy of the Award and a copy of the letter of authority may be furnished to the appellant s counsel, pursuant to which a signed copy of the award with a copy of the letter of authority was furnished to the said counsel.

Finding of the Court:

1. An order dismissing an application under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as barred by time did not amount to setting aside the Award within the meaning of the expression used in clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of Section 39 and was, therefore, not appealable under Section 39 of the Act. 2. Although the judgment was a "judgment" within the meaning both of Section 10 of the High Court Act and of clause 10 of the Letters Patent, it was nevertheless not appealable under the said provisions by virtue of the bar provided in Section 39 (1) of the Act to appeals from orders other than those set out in it.

Issues: 1. Whether the application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is barred by time? 2. Is the award unstamped and if so, what is its effect? 3. Whether the respondent is not competent to take up the plea regarding the award being unstamped? 4. Whether the arbitrator reviewed his order dated 22-2-1968 and if so, what is its effect?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. An order dismissing an application under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as barred by time did not amount to setting aside the Award within the meaning of the expression used in clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of Section 39 and was, therefore, not appealable under Section 39 of the Act. 2. Although the judgment was a "judgment" within the meaning both of Section 10 of the High Court Act and of clause 10 of the Letters Patent, it was nevertheless not appealable under the said provisions by virtue of the bar provided in Section 39 (1) of the Act to appeals from orders other than those set out in it.

Final Decision: Appeal dismissed.