The cause of action for eviction based on the personal need of the owner is personal to him and does not survive after his death.

( 1 ) THIS second appeal under Section 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act ) must be dismissed on the short ground that by virtue of an order made by the Controller on December 10, 1971. allowing the amendment of the petition for eviction, it has become infructuous.

( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to the appeal may be briefly stated. Syed Ashaq Ali, the owner of the property in dispute filed a petition for the eviction of the appellants, inter alia, on the grounds that the said owner bona fide needed the premises in dispute for his personal need as a residence. The petition was also based on two other grounds, namely, that the appellants had unauthorisedly sublet and had damaged the demised premises. During the pendency of the petition, the owner died leaving the present respondents as his legal representatives. The appellants made an application to the Additional Rent Controller that the cause of action for the petition for eviction of the appellants had died with the original owner and the proceedings, therefore, did not survive and the petition should acccrdingly be dismissed. This application was turned down by the Additional Rent Controller by his order made on May 5, 1973. In the course of the order, learned Additional Rent Controller came to the conclusion that his predecessor had held that the right to sue survived to the legal representatives that the said order had become final and was not open to review; that the Supreme Court in the case of Phool Rani and others v. Naubat Rai hluwalia, bad merely held that the right to sue did not survive with regard to the personal need of the landlord ; that the present petition was based on grounds other than the personal need as well and, therefore, it could not besaid the petition could not proceed. The order of the Additional Rent Controller was upheld in appeal under Section 38 of the Act by the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, an additional argument was urged on behalf of the appellants that in any event having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Phool Rani (supra), the petition of the respondents, in so far as it sought eviction on the ground of personal bona fide need of the original owner could not be proceeded with as the said cause of action, being personal to the owner who had since died, died with him and did notsurvive. This contention of the appellants was turned down on the ground that the original owner had sought the eviction of the appellants on the ground of subletting and damage to the property as well. It was, however, observed that "the question whether the respondents were entitled to claim eviction under clause (e) would remain open. "

( 3 ) THE impugned order of the Tribunal has been assailed before me by Shri Gian Chand Mittal, learned counsel for the appellants on the ground that the cause of action with regard to the personal need of the then owner was personal to him, did not survive on his death and the petition in so far as it sought eviction of the appellants on that ground could not proceed and the Tribunal was, therefore, in error in keeping the said ground alive.

( 4 ) SHRI Mohd. Mian, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, sought to justify the impugned order on the ground that the petition, based on grounds other than personal bona fide need of the previous onwer, can proceed even after the death of the owner not only with regard to the grounds regarding subletting and damage to the property but also with regard to the ground of personal bona fide need of The present owners, i. e , the respondent which has since been substituted in the petition for that of the previous owner by virtue of the order made by the Additional Rent Countroler on December, 10, 1971 allowing leave to the respondents to amend the petition. So as to add the ground of personal need of the respondents and urged that the amendment had since been carried out, the appellant s counsel had acted on the o