Yogeshwar Dayal, J.

( 1 ) THIS is a tenant s appeal against the concurrent judgments of the Additional Rent Controller and the Tribunal ordering ejectment of the appellant under Proviso (e) to section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1938 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"),

( 2 ) THE facts of the case are that the respondent landlady filed the prevent petition for eviction of the appellant from the premises in dispute on the ground that the premises in dispute were let out to the tenant-appellant for residence and that now the premises are bona- fide required for herself and for her only daughter who is married and is residing with the respondent depending on her. It. was pleaded by the respondent that she has only one room, one Kotha, one kitchen on the first floor of the building which is also occupied by the appellant and besides herself her daughter alongwith three children and her husband was also residing with the respondent and that the respondent does not have any reasonably suitable accommodation for herself and her family members. The appellant disputed the purpose of letting being only residential and pleaded that the premises were let out both for residential and commercial purposes The appellant also denied that the premises are required by the respondent. It was also pleaded by the appellant that the daughter of the respondent is not dependent upon the respondent. It was, however, not denied that the daughter of the respondent alongwith her family has been residing with the landlady. The service of notice was also denied. The Additional Rent Controller held that the premises were let for residential purposes and the incidental user by the appellant would not convert the purpose of letting. The Rent Controller also found that the land-lady s daughter and her son-in-law with their children had been residing with the land-lady since a long time ; that the daughter, was dependent on her mother, the land-lady, for residence and that the land-lady respondent had no other suitable accommodation. Dissatisfied by the order of the Additional Rent Controller, the appellant filed an appeal before the Tribunal who, as stated earlier, also dismissed the appeal vide order dated 17th August, 1972.

( 3 ) THE Tribunal agreed with the finding of the Additional Rent Controller. The Tribunal held that the land-lady is a widow and had no other issue to look after her and she had only one daughter who had been living with the land-lady and in these circumstances the daughter would be included in the word self used in proviso (e) to section 14 (1) of the Act. The Tribunal held that the accommodation with the land-lady is wholly insufficient for her bonafide personal requirements. Before the Tribunal, service of a valid notice determining tenancy was also challenged but the Tribunal found that notice dated 31st July, 1968, had been served on the appellant in view of the report of refusal dated 3rd August 1968. (by mistake the Tribunal has noted the date as 3rd August 1972 ).

( 4 ) MR. Bhagwan Singh, learned counsel for the appellant has not contested the other findings of the courts below except (1) that the daughter and her family could not be considered as members dependent on the land-lady as she is married and her husband is earning independently; and (2) that no notice determining the tenancy was served on the appellant.

( 5 ) IN supporter the first submission that the daughter and her husband and children could not be considered as dependent on the landlady, the learned counsel relied upon C. L. Daver v. Amar Nath Kapur, in which Falshaw C. J. construed the meaning of the word " dependent " appearing in section 14 (1) (e) and it was held that it cannot be construed as meaning nothing but wholly dependent in the sense of not earning anything at all and being entirely dependent on the parents (in that case the father) for board, lodging and food. The term must be construed as meaning somebody not wholly independent or sel

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