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1974 Supreme(Del) 179

High Court Of Delhi
LAKSHMI CHAND - Appellant
Versus
IQBAL SINGH - Respondent
Civil 119 of 1973
Decided On : 08/26/1974

Advocates Appeared:
A.C.Sehgal, N.S.SISTANI

An unregistered partition deed is inadmissible in evidence, and no oral evidence can be led to prove the ownership of the passage dealt with in such a deed.

Headnote:

PARTITION - REGISTRATION ACT, 1908 - SECTION 49 - EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 - SECTIONS 91 AND 92 - ADMISSIBILITY OF UNREGISTERED PARTITION DEED - ORAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE OWNERSHIP OF PASSAGE - INADMISSIBILITY.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiffs and defendant jointly bought two houses, one in front and the other on the back. The entrance to the back house was from the front house. For partition, they wrote a deed marked 'a'. A passage for entry to the back house was reserved to the owner of the back house, plaintiff's father. The defendant owned the front house and built an upper floor, made some construction on the partition wall, opened a door, and windows towards the passage. Plaintiffs claimed that the passage was their exclusive property and the defendant had no right to raise the height of the partition wall and open doors and windows. They sued him for an injunction.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the partition deed marked 'a' was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. It was an instrument of partition that allotted the passage to the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest and was compulsorily required to be registered. No oral evidence could be led or considered for the purpose of giving a finding of ownership of the passage.

Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiffs were the owners of the partition wall? 2. Whether they exclusively owned the passage? 3. Whether they were entitled to an injunction?

Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on Sections 49, 91, and 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872, and Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, to hold that the unregistered partition deed was inadmissible in evidence. It also referred to various case laws to support its conclusion that no oral evidence could be led to prove the ownership of the passage.

Final Decision: The court allowed the appeals, reversed the findings of the lower courts on issue No. 2, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

Yogeshwar Dayal

( 1 ) PARTIES jointly bought two houes. One was in front and the other on the back. Entrance to the back was from the front house. For partition they wrote a deed marked a . A passage for entry to back house was reserved to owner of back house, plaintiff s father. Defendant owned front house who built upper floor and made some construction on partition wall and opened a door and windows towards passage. Plaintiffs claiming that passage was their exclusive property and defendant had no right to raise height of partition wall and open door and windows sued him for injunction. Trial Court framed issues, whether plaintiffs were owners of partition wall, whether they exclusively owned passage and whether they were etitled to injunction. Partition deed a was held inadmissible being unnegistererd. Trial Court partly decreed suit while it was decreed in full in 1st appeal. Defendant filed 2nd appeal. After narrating above facts, para 7 onwards judgment is ;-

( 2 ) THE appellants challenged the findings of the courts below on all the issues. Mr. Sehgal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that (1) there was no legal evidence to prove the exclusive ownership of the passage in dispute as being of the plaintiffs-respondents : (2) that the finding that the house was not constructed till April 1964 is erroneous ; and (3) that the finding that the windows in dispute were constructed on the plaintiffs wall was also erroneous as being based on no evidence.

( 3 ) VARIOUS submissions were made by the learned counsel to substantiate his last two submissions. I am afraid the finding as to what time the house was constructed and when the windows were opened and whether they were built in the absence of the plaintiffs are all questions of fact. Again, the finding whether the windows were constructed on the wall built by the plaintiffs on the passage in dispute is a pure question of fact. There is enough evidence to show that the windows were built by the defendant on one of the twparallel walls built by the plaintiffs and it is not a case where the finding can be said to be vitiated being based on no evidence. However, the main submission of Mr. Sehgal is that the finding that the plaintiffs were the exclusive owner of the passage is based on no legal evidence. To substantiate his submission the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that both the courts below have held that the partition deed marked a not being admissible no oral evidence could be led to prove the partition of any part of the property dealt with by the said deed It was submitted that the alleged passage is allotted to the plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest by virtue of the partition deed marked a by clause (1) of the partition deed and therefore, in view of sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, no oral evidence could at all be led to prove that the passage in dispute fell to the share of the plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, and if it be held that the passage still remains joint property the plaintiffs would not be entitled to the relief of either perpetual injunction or the mandatory injunction prayed for by them.

( 4 ) MR. Sistani. learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the findings of the courts below that the document marked a was inadmissible in evidence was not correct. Itwas submitted that the said document did not affect any immovable property comprised therein, nor did it purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any light, title or interest to or in immovable property. It was submitted that document marked a was merely a recital of past transaction namely of oral partition and therefore neither section 49 of the Registration Act nor sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act came into play.

( 5 ) THE first question which will thus arise is to determine the nature of the document which is marked as a . It is clear from the averments made by the plaintiffs in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the plaint that






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