The court exercised discretion under Article 227 and refused to dismiss the claim petition, considering that substantial justice had already been done and no interference was called for, despite acknowledging the lack of jurisdiction prior to the amendment of the notification.

V. S. Dashpande, J.

( 1 ) TWO contentions are urged: (1) The Tribunal was originally constituted under sub section (1) of section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 for adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. Subsequently, section 110 was amended by Act 56 of 1969 which came into force on 2nd of March, 1970 empowering the Government to constitute a tribunal to inquire into the claims arising not only involving the death of or bodily injury to persons but also in respect of damage to any property of a third party. The learned counsel contends that there is no notification under section 110 (1) reconstituting the tribunal for the trial of both these kinds of claims. All that was done was to issue a notification dated 8th October, 1971 amending the notification of 11th September, 1970 by the addition of the words "or damage to any property of a third party so asising or both. " By the notification of 11. 9. 70 Mr. S. D. Tyagi was appointed as a Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for adjudication upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving only the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. Reading the two notifications together therefore, from 8th October, 1971 a valid tribunal was constituted for the adjudication of claims relating both to personal injuries as well as to damage to property. Since the tribunal was already in existence, it was not necessary to reconstitute it. It was only necessary to add to its jurisdiction. As this was so the requirements of Section 110 (1) were satisfied with effect from 8th October, 1971 or rather with effect from 21 October, 1971 when the notification of 8th October, 1971 appears to have been published. This contention, therefore, is not maintainable.

( 2 ) THE claim petition claiming compensation for damage could not, therefore, have been instituted validly before this tribunal prior to 21st October, 1971 when the amended notification was published. The claim petition could have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the tribunal but was erroneously entertained. Had the objection to the jurisdiction been taken prior to 21st October, 1971, it would have prevailed. The objection was taken by the petitioner on 19. 2. 71 and it should have prevailed. The right course for the claimant was to have filed a civil suit in as much as the tribunal had not been given jurisdiction to try a claim for damage to property. The position now however is this. The claimant cannot now file a civil suit. For, the tribunal with the enlarged jurisdiction has already been constituted. It is true that the cause of action for the claimant arose before the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Before the amendment of 21. 10. 71, a civil suit would I have been competent. But thereafter it was not competent. For, the claimant had no vested right in the procedure. The procedure by which his claim is governed must take effect from the date on which it comes into force. After the tribunal is constituted no claimant can say that he would still go to the civil court because his cause of action arose before the tribunal was constituted even though the claim is being made after the tribunal is constituted.

( 3 ) THERE are thus only two options open to the Tribunal. Technically speaking the tribunal may dismiss the claim petition on the ground that when the petition was filed the tribunal did not have jurisdiction to entertain it. On the other hand the tribunal may acknowledge this legal position and yet refuse to dismiss the claim petition because subsequent to its filing the tribunal has obtained jurisdiction to entertain it. I am inclined to favour the second course of action because even if the petition was to be dismissed on the ground of jurisdiction, it would have to be refiled immediately by the claimant and would have t

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