V. S. DESHPANDE, J.

( 1 ) ON the termination of their employment with the petitioner. Respondents 2 and 3 applied to the petitioner for payment of gratuity under section 7 (1) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The employer denied that Respondents 2 and 3 were its "employees" within the meaning of section 2 (e) of the said Act. The dispute between them went to the Controlling Authority under section 7 (4) (a) of the Act. The Controlling Authority issued notices (Annexures Rill and RIV annexed to the written statement of Respondent No. 1) to the petitioner to appear before it on the 17th April, 1973 to answer the claim of Respondents 2 and 3 regarding gratuity. The petitioner was told that if it did not appear the dispute would be determined ex-parte. The petitioner took an adjournment from the Respondent No. 1 and filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings before the Controlling Authority. The main contention of the petitioner is that Respondents 2 and 3 are not "employees" within the meaning of section 2 (e) of the Act. They are not, therefore, entitled to gratuity. The petitioner further contends that the jurisdiction of the Controlling Authority under section 7 (4) (b) is confined to the determination of only "the amount of gratuity payable to an employee". The Authority has no jurisdiction to determine whether Respondents 2 and 3 are employees of the petitioner.

( 2 ) THIS contention is not sufficient for us to quash the proceedings before the Controlling Authority. As observed by S. A. de Smith in his "judicial Review of Administrative Action" second edition, page 98, "often it is reasonable to infer that Parliament has intended to. demarcate two areas of inquiry, the tribunal s findings within one area being conclusive and within the other area impeachable". This observation is in line with the well known distinction made by Lord Esher, M. R. , in Queen v. Special Commissioner of income-tax (1888) 21 QBD 313 at 319 that quasi-judicial powers may be exercised by two kinds of administrative authorities or tribunals, namely, (1) by those whose jurisdiction depends on facts and preconditions, the existence of which is to be decided by the civil courts, and (2) those who are given the power to decide even the jurisdicational facts on the proof of which their jurisdiction depends. The jurisdiction of the Controlling Authority to determine the amount of gratuity depends on the pre-existence of the relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and the Respondents 2 and 3. These jurisdictional conditions cannot be finally determined by the Controlling Authority. But this only means that the conclusion which the Controlling Authority may arrive at on this issue is impeachable by the aggrieved party in a civil court. (Magiti Sasamal V. Pandab Bissoi, (1962-3 SCR 673 ). This does not mean, however, that the Controlling Authority cannot at all inquire into this issue or that the petitioner can disable the Controlling Authority from making an inquiry by merely denying that the Respondents 2 and 3 are its employees. On the contrary, the Legislature has intended that initially the Controlling Authority may find out whether the relationship of employer and employee exists. If he finds that it does not exist, then he would drop the proceedings. If he finds that it exists, he would continue the proceedings to determine the amount of gratuity. This is subject to the right of the aggrieved party to go to the civil court for a final determination of this issue which goes to the jurisdiction of the Controlling Authority. The various administrative authorities and tribunals established by the Legislature and felling within the first class of tribunals referred to in Queen v. Special Commissioners of Income-tax function in this way. They make a preliminary determination of the existence of the conditions on which their jurisdiction depends. They are not barred from doing so. They do

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