The requisition of property under the Delhi Premises (Requisition and Eviction) Act, 1947 and the subsequent allotment of the property to non-government servants under the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952.

( 1 ) THIS apeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against, a judgment of a learned Single Judge in Civil Writ No. 288 of 1968 -delivered on 1st September, 1969 whereby the petition was accepted and the respondents were directed to de-requisition the premises and restore the posses- sion thereof to its owner. The appellants are the collector of Delhi and Delhi Administration while the respondent is Smt. Savant Kaur, resident of 49/s3, Western Extension Area, Karol Bagh, New Delhi.

( 2 ). The petition relates to house No. 49, Blok No. 53 Western Extension Area, Karol Bagh, New Delhi of which the respondent claims to be the owner. The property originally belonged to one Mr Chopra and was requisitioned by an order of the Collector Delhi under Section 3 (4) of the Delhi Premises (Requisition and Eviction) Act, 1947 which will hereafter be REFERRED TO as the old Act with effect from 26th March. 1949 in response to an application filed by the Central Relief Committee of the All India Congress Committee for providing accommodation to the workers of the said relief Committee who were engaged in the relief and rehabilitation work in the State of Delhi.

( 3 ). On 17th November, 1961 the respondent who had purchased the property from Mr. Chopra, made a representation to the Collector that she was in urgent need of the property herself On 13th August, 1965 two rooms in the said house were de-requisitioned but as no separate kitchen, bathroom and latrine were available to her the rooms were not suitable for her residence.

( 4 ). The respondent contended that as she had not been keeping good health for several years and she needed the property for her own use and that the purpose for which the accommodation was given to the Relief Committee of the All-India Congress Committee no longer existed, the property should be de-requisitioned. Her application was however rejected and it was said that it was not possible to de-requisition the remaining portion of the house immediately; but as soon as alternative accommodation was available for the present occupants, action for de-re- quistioning the premises would betaken. In January 1968 one of the flats in the said house fell vacant but instead of de-requisitioning the same it was allotred to on Mr. Jha, a teacher. The respondent thereupon applied to the Collector Delhi complaining that the house had not been de-requisitioned as promised earlier, more so when some of the persons to whom portions in the house had been allotted were very quarrelsome and did not allow the respondent even to use the common kitchen, bath-room and latrine. No action was however taken in response to that representation.

( 5 ). The respondent thereupon filed a petition therein she urged inter-alia that the purpose for which the premises were de-requisitioned having come to an end the requisition could not be allowed to continue any longer and refusal to de requisition was in the circumstances contrary to law. The appellants who were respondents in the petition however contended that the requisition under the old Act should be deemed to be a de-requisition under Section 3 of the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 which will hereafter be described as the new Act and since after the coming into force of the new Act for a public purpose the requisition continued to be a valid one under the new Act.

( 6 ). The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the premises requistioned for the purpose of the Central Relief Committee of the All-India Congress Committee could not be said to have been retained after the winding up of the said Relief Committee. On the other hand evidence had been placed on record when certain individuals who were admitted to be in possession of the premises were not even Government servants it was clear that the purpose for which the property had been requisitioned and used had ceased to exist. In that view of the matter the respondent s applicat