Service on a lawyer is presumed to be service on the client, but this presumption can be rebutted if the party shows that he was not informed or that he had got no information. This presumption vanishes completely if the appointment of the lawyer is not on the record at all.

( 1 ) THIS is a Second Appeal under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 by the tenant, Udho Ram. The landlord, Ishwar Datt had brought an application for ejectment of the tenant from premises situated at 4-1/55, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, on the ground of non-payment of rent as well as bona fide peronal requirement. This application was pending before Shri D. C. Aggarwal, Rent Controller, Delhi, but was transferred to Shri P. K. Bahri, Additional Rent Controller. After it had been transferred, the tenant did not appear and consequently, the landlord obtained an ex-parte eviction order against the tenant on 9th June, 1969. On 21st July, 1969, the tenant moved an application for setting aside the ex-parte order on the ground that the case was pending before Shri D. C. Aggarwal, Additional Rent Controller till 15th October, 1968. When Shri Aggarwal relinquished charge, he claimed he bad been told that a notice would be sent intimating him the date of bearing before the transferee court, but no notice had been received by him. He also pleaded that he had only learnt of the ex-parte order on 20th July, 1959. This application was rejected by the Additional Rent Controller and the tenant s appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal has also been rejected. Now he has come to this Court in Second Appeal.

( 2 ) THE facts of the case are not very much in dispute. When the case was transferred to the court of Shri P. K. Bahri, Additional Rent Controller, notices were ordered to issue to the tenant through his counsel, and notices were issued three times. On the first occasion. Shri Mohan Singh, the tenant s counsel wrote on the notice; "i have ceased to be respondent s counsel. " The said notice is Exhibit A-l. He later refused the summons again. On the third occasion, i. e. , en 2nd June, 1969, he again returned the notice stating "i have already stated on an earlier notice that I am no more a counsel in the case and that service be effected on the party direct. " This document is Exhibit A-2. It appears from the statement of S. Mohan Singh, as R. W. I, that he did inform his client that a notice had come which he had refused.

( 3 ) THE application for setting aside the ex-parte eviction order was rejected by the Additional Rent Controller on the ground that S. Mohan Smgh had not sought the leave of the court to withdraw from the case and, hence the notice was to be deemed to have been duly served on the party because service on the lawyer was a good service of the party concerned. It was also held that the statement of S. Mohan Singh flowed that he had informed the tenant and hence there was no sufficient cause for the tenant not being present at the hearing. As regards the date of knowledge, the Controller thought that the tenant must have learnt of the order on 15th July, 1969 when he sought to deposit rent in accordance with an order under Section 15 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. On that application, it was noted that an ex-parte eviction order had already been passed. Thus, the Controller found that the date of knowledge of the tenant would be 15th July, 1969 and not 20th July, 1969 as claimed by him.

( 4 ) ON apeal before the Tribunal, reliance was placed on Order 3, Rule 4 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and it was held that every appointment of a pleader was to be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the Pleader. Hence, the power of attorney filed by the counsel was deemed to be in force until the proceedings ended. It was, therefore, concluded that as the power of attorney continued to be in force, service on S. Mohan Single was a valid service on the tenant. It was also held that the statement of S. Mohan Singh, Advocate to the effect that he had informed the tenant could. not be disbelieved and, hence there was no unfairness in the passing of the-ex-parte eviction order.

( 5 ) AT the hearing of this appeal, Mr. Sapra, learned counsel for the