SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1972 Supreme(Del) 107

High Court Of Delhi
TULA RAM - Appellant
Versus
B.K.ASWANI - Respondent
SECOND APPEAL 496 of 1968
Decided On : 04/11/1972

A compromise order passed on appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal cannot be treated as an order under Section 15 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, unless it is passed strictly in compliance with the terms of the section.

Headnote:

DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT, 1958 - SECTION 14 (2), 15 (1), 15 (6), 15 (7) - NON-PAYMENT OF RENT - PREVIOUS BENEFIT OF DEPOSIT UNDER SECTION 15 (1) - COMPROMISE ORDER ON APPEAL - WHETHER AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 15 (1) - HELD, NO.

Fact of the Case:

Landlord filed an eviction petition against the tenant for non-payment of rent under Section 14 (1) (a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The landlord claimed that the tenant had previously taken the benefit of making a deposit under Section 15 (1) of the Act and hence the present ejectment petition should be allowed. The Additional Rent Controller ordered the tenant's ejectment, but the Rent Control Tribunal reversed the decision, holding that the tenant had not previously obtained the benefit of making a deposit under Section 15 (1) of the Act. The landlord appealed to the High Court.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that the tenant had not previously obtained the benefit of making a deposit under Section 15 (1) of the Act. The Court noted that in the previous case, the tenant did not make any deposit under Section 15 (1) of the Act and suffered a decree of ejectment. The Court further held that the compromise order passed on appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal could not be treated as an order under Section 15 (1) of the Act, as it was not passed strictly in compliance with the terms of the section.

Issues: Whether the tenant had previously obtained the benefit of making a deposit under Section 15 (1) of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the tenant had not previously obtained the benefit of making a deposit under Section 15 (1) of the Act. The Court noted that in the previous case, the tenant did not make any deposit under Section 15 (1) of the Act and suffered a decree of ejectment. The Court further held that the compromise order passed on appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal could not be treated as an order under Section 15 (1) of the Act, as it was not passed strictly in compliance with the terms of the section.

Final Decision: The High Court dismissed the landlord's appeal and upheld the decision of the Rent Control Tribunal.

D. K. Kapur

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the landlord Shri Tula Ram under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The application for eviction in the present case was on the ground of non-payment of rent under section 14 (1) (a) of the said Act. Arrears of rent had been claimed with effect from 1st January, 1964, at the rate of Rs. 200. 00 per month. A notice of demand dated 4th August, 1964 was served on the tenant, Shri B. K. Aswani. According to the the landlord, this was acase of second default an J, hence no order under section 15 (1) of the Act was passed. It was claimed by the landlond that in a previous case the tenant had already taken the benefit of making a deposit under section 15 (1) of the Act and consequently failure to pay the rent in response to the notice of demand eatitled the landord to a decree for ejectment. This case was accepted by the Additional Rent Controller, who ordered the tenant s ejectment by the order dated 27th March, 1967.

( 2 ) THE tenant appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal, where it was held that in the previous case no benefit, had been taken under the provisions of section 15 (1) of the Act and, hence the present ejectment petition had to fail. The landlord has now appealed to this Court to challenge the decision of the Kent Control Tribunal.

( 3 ) THE question whether the tenant has previously obtained the benefit of making a deposit under section 15 (1) of the Act has to be determined by reference to the facts of the previous case. In that case which was also brought on the ground of non-payment of rent, there was no deposit made under section 15 (1) of the Act and the defence of the tenant was sruck out under section l5. (7) of the Act and an ejectment order was passed by the then Rent Controller, Sri Asa Sing Gill on 1st April, 1963. An appeal was taken by the tenant to the Rent Control Trit unal, then Shri Pritam Singh Pattar. The parties compromised appeal and agreed that the tenant would deposit a sum of Rs. 3,900. 00 representing the rent from 1st May, 1961 to 30th June, 1963 on or before 18th July, 1963 in the Court of the Rent Controller. If the deposit was not made the eviction decree would stand, otherwise it would be set aside. In fact the tenant did make the deposit within the time fixed by the compromise. The Rent Control Tribunal held in the decision under appeal that the order passed on a compromise before the Rent Control Tribunal could by no stretch of imagintion besaid -to be an order under section 15 (1) of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant contests this decision.

( 4 ) UNDER the provisions of section 14 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, a tenant who makes a deposit as required by section 15 is saved from ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent. However, this benefit cannot be availed of by him if he thereafter makes a default in payment of rent for three consecutive months. The question whether the tenant in the present case got the benefit of avoiding ejectment by making a deposit under section 15 is very easily answered, in the previous case the tenant did not make any deposit under section 15 (1) of the Act and sufferred a decree of ejectment. However, on appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal, a compromise was effected which enabled the tenant to avoid ejectment if he paid a sum of Rs, 3,900. 00 which was calculated to be the rent up to 12th June, 1963. This was by no means an order under section 15 (1) of the Act because it was entirely passed on a compromise and not at all under section 15. Mr C. B Lal, learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that there are decisions showing that a compromise order can be treated as an order under section 15 (1) of the Act. I may now refer to those decisions.

( 5 ) IN Bhoj Dutt v. Brij Nanin Bigai, I held that a particular order which was passed on a compromise could be read as an order passed under section 15 (1) of the Act. In that case, no specified order under section 15 (1) of th



Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Judicial Analysis

AI

SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top