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1971 Supreme(Del) 169

High Court Of Delhi
DAVID BROWN - Appellant
Versus
SWJIT SINGH - Respondent
SECOND APPEAL 37 of 1971
Decided On : 06/19/1971

Advocates Appeared:
A.K.KUBA, B.K.MAN SINGH

Subsequent events and substantial justice should be taken into account in deciding eviction appeals under the Delhi Rent Control Act.

Headnote:

Eviction - Delhi Rent Control Act - Interpretation of proviso (e)

Fact of the Case:

The court considered whether the eviction orders against the tenants were illegal due to the landlord filing the petition for eviction more than two years ahead of the date of his retirement.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that while the Controller's decision to entertain the premature petitions was ill-advised, subsequent events and substantial justice had to be taken into account. The court refrained from allowing the appeals and instead dismissed them with the direction that the orders for eviction shall not be executable until after the expiry of four months after 17th of August, 1971 or the actual retirement of the landlord respondent, whichever is later.

Issues: The main issue was whether the mistake of not rejecting the petitions as premature constituted a substantial question of law, and whether subsequent events and substantial justice should influence the decision.

Ratio Decidendi: The court considered the interpretation of proviso (e) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, emphasizing that subsequent events and substantial justice should be taken into account in deciding the appeal.

Final Decision: The appeals were dismissed with the direction that the orders for eviction shall not be executable until after the expiry of four months after 17th of August, 1971 or the actual retirement of the landlord respondent, whichever is later.

V. S. Deshpande

( 1 ) THE sole question for decision in these two connected second appeals (SAO. 37 and 42 of 1971) is whether the orders of eviction passed by the Controller against these two tenants who are the appellants in favour of the common respondent who is the landlord under proviso (e) to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 were illegal on the ground that the petition for eviction by the landlord were filed in November, 1968 though the actual date of retirement of the landlord was 17th August, 1971.

( 2 ) LEARNED Counsel for the tenant appellants are on strong ground in urging that the decision must solely rest upon the construction of proviso (e) which is in the following terms :-

"that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof or for-any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. "they point out the use of the present tense "are required by the Legislature showing that the need of the land lord for the premises must have arisen before he can apply for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that the premises are required by the landlord for his own residence. For, after all no suit or petition can be filed unless and until the cause of action for the same has not arisen, is liable to be dismissed as premature. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would urge that the retirement of a Government servant is a certain event even though it may not have actually taken place when the petition was filed. It was not contingent in the sense that ic may or may not happen. Retirement is almost as certain as death for a person cannot serve the Government beyond the age fixed for retirement under the rule of law. It is well known that the tenants generally resist a petition for eviction on all possible grounds and landlord has to fight a long drawn litigation with the tenants before he could ultimately get possession of the premises. This of course does not mean that the landlord is as a matter of law entitled to file an eviction petition always ahead of the date of his retirement. The question really is to apply proviso (e) in a pragmatic maner without being too technical for instance, in A. P. Madhavan v. M. P. Ram Chanderan, 1970 All India Rent Control Journal 479, the landlord had actually been transferred from Perinthalmanna to Pathiripala but he had not actually and physically taken over at the latter place. He filed a petition for eviction of his tenant residing in the premises at the latter place before he actually shifted to the latter place. It was argued that on the date of the petition, the landlord was still at the former place and not at the latter place and therefore, he had set up only a future and not a present need in his eviction petition and that this was fatal to the success. This contention was rejected on two grounds. Firstly, it was held that the transfer was reasonably expected and it was not necessary that there should be a current urgent need. It was enough that if it was reasonably likely to arise in the near future. Secondly by the tima of the decision of the case, the landlord had actually shifted to Pathiripala and, therefore, the Court was bound to take into account the subsequent event which occured before the decision of the case.

( 3 ) PROVISO (e) of section 14 (l) has, therefore, to be reasonably construed. On the one hand, the landlord may file the petition for eviction a short time ahead of the actual date of his retirement if the retirement would definitely take place before the decision of the petition in the trial court itself. For, in such a case the trial Court can be certain on the date of the decision that the landlord has retired and the petition is not premature, if the trial court t



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