The limitation period for making an application for fixation of standard rent under Section 12 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, starts from the date of the letting of the property to the tenant against whom the application is made.

( 1 ) THIS appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, is by the tenant and arises out of an application for fixation of standard rent instituted by the landlords. Property in question was originally owned by a Muslim who migrated to Pakistan and consequently the property vested in the Custodian of Evacuee properly. The properly became a part of the compensation pool under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and was auctioned to Har Kishan Lal and others on 2nd July, 1959. Provisional possession of the property was delivered to the purchasers on 24th February, 1960 and a sale certificate was granted on 30th July, 1962. In accordance with the letter delivering provisional possession the tenant attorned to the purchasers. An application for fixation of standard rent was instituted before the Rent Controller on 29th July, 1964. The property was later on transferred to the present landlords. According to the landlords they became entitled to apply for fixation of standard rent only after the sale deed was executed in favour of Har Kishan Lal and others on 30th July, 1962. The tenant contested this application on the ground that it was barred by time. The Additional Rent Controller held that the limitation period for moving the application started from the date of the coming into force of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on 9th February, 1959 and, hence the petition should have been brought by reason of Section 12 of the Act within two years of the coming into force of the Act. In short, the Additional Rent Controller held that the limitation period expired on 10th February, 1961 and the application was hopelessly barred by time.

( 2 ) ON appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal by the landlords, it was held that the limitation period only started from the date the sale certificate was granted to the purchasers. Relying on Section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1954, it was held that the letting of the properly took place only when the tenant became a tenant by virtue of this Section, as previously the tenant is only an allottee or a licensee under the Custodian or the Central Government. Thus, the Tribunal held that the limitation period came to an end on 29th July, 1964 and hence the application was filed in time.

( 3 ) HE tenant has appealed to this Court and reliance is placed on an unreported judgment of Deshpande J. in Harbans Lal v. Arjan Dass Bhasin. In that case it was held that the letting took place when provisional possession was delivered to the landlord. In that judgment, mention of another decision in Krishan Kumar v. Des Raj was also made. Apparently no referrence was made to Section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. I had myself an occasion to deal with this question in a decision reported as M/s. R. Wright and Partners (Private) Ltd. New Delhi v S. Jaswant Singh and others, I had there followed the Supreme Court judgment in Bishan Paul v. Mothu Ram. It is quite clear that a tenancy cannot be created by the giving of provisional possession which by itself does not create any tenancy at all. In that judgment, their Lordshids had resolved the conflict between the various decisions of the Punjab High Court and of other High Courts relating to the applicability of the Rent Control Acts to properties which had been sold in circumstances like the present. Their Lordships held that the properly was really transferred not on the date of the sale certificate but on the date of the payment of the compensation. Their Lordships approved of the judgment of the Punjab High Court in Roshanlal Goswami v. Gabind Ram. and held that a landlord s right to bring a suit for ejectment under the Rent Control Act depended on the issue of the sale certificate In other words, their Lordships held that the limitation started on the dale of the confirmation of the sale. Reference was also made to the decision in Bo