The provisions of Order 21. Rule 16 C. PC. are applicable to the execution of the order paused under the Delhi Rent Control Act, trough the order are not decrees.

( 1 ) THIS appeal, against an appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal, has aiisen out of an application made under Order 21 Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure by Shri Madan Lal respondent and his brother Shri Harish Chand.

( 2 ) THE appellant was a tenant of the premises in dispute under Shri Lakhu Ram, father of Shri Madan Lal and Shri Harish Chand, Shri Lakhu Ram had filed an application, under section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, for the eviction of the appellant on the ground that he bonafide required the premises in dispute for occupation for residence for himself and for the members of the family dependent on him. The order, directing the eviction of the appellant was passed on the 17th January, 1964. The Additional Controller had held that Shri Madan Lal and his family members were dependent on Shri Lakhu Ram and that Shri Lakhu Ram bonafide required the premises in dispute for residence for himself, Shri Madan Lal and the members of his family. The appellant went up in appeal against the order of eviction. During the pendency of the appeal, Shri Harish Chand, the second son of Shri Lakhu Ram, was transferred to Delhi from Saharanpur. Shri Lakhu Ram put in an application, alleging that the premises in dispute were also required for the residence of Shri Harish Chand and his family. The Rent Control Tribunal allowed this application and held [hat Shri Lakhu Ram genuinly required the premises in dispute for residence for himself, Shri Madan Lal and his family and Shri Harish Chand and his family. The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed on the 24th July, 1964. Shri Lakhu Ram died on the 9th June, 1965. Shri Madan Lal and Harish Chand made an application for execution of the order of eviction on the 9th July, 1965 for want of permission of the Competent Authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act for execution of the eviction order. Shri Majan Lal and Shri Harish Chand then filed the present application underorder 21, Rule 16 of the Cod; of Civil Procedure. It was stated that Shri Lakhu Ram had executed a will in favour of Shri Madan Lal and Harish Chand, bequeathing all his property of them ft was requested that in execution of the order of eviction, possession, of the premises may be delivered. The application was contested on behalf of the appellant. He pleaded that Shri Madan Lal and Shri Harish Chand had no locus standi to make the application, as they had not got any succession certificate or Letters of Administration or a probate of the will. The appellant denied the existance of any will in favour of Shri Madan Lal and Shri Harish Chand. The appellant contended that that there was no question of substitution of Shri Madan Lal and Shri Harish Chand in place of Shri Lakhu Ram as the eviction order had been passed on the ground of the personal necessity of Shri Lakhu Ram only. The learned Additional Controller rejected the pleas of the appellant. He held that Shri Lakhu Ram had made a valid will in favour of Shri Madan Lal and Shri Harish Chand and that they had locus standi to execute the eviction order. He further held that the probate of the will was not necessary for execution of the eviction order. But the Additional Controller allowed only Shri Madan Lal, to execute the eviction order. He had done so perhaps under the impression that before him. Shri Lakhu Ram had pleaded his own requirement and that of Shri Madan Lal and not of Shri Harish Chand. It appears that the order of the Rent Control Tribunal holding that the premises were bonafide required by Shri Lakhu Ram for himself and for Shri Madan Lal Harish Chand and their families were not brought to the notice of the Additional Controller.

( 3 ) THE appeal of the appellant against the order of the Additional Controller allowing Shri Madan La] to execute the order of eviction was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal. Hence this second appeal. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that Sh