The accused does not have a statutory right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses before the charge is framed, but the court may, as a matter of discretion, allow the accused to do so. However, the court can impose a time limit on the cross-examination if it is irrelevant, repetitive, or unduly prolonged.

Hardayal Hardy, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioner in this case is the printer and publisher of a pamphlet entitled "i was a C. I. A. Agent in India" by John D. Smith. He is being prosecuted by Shri E. T. Sen, a former Brigadier in the Indian Army, for offences under sections 500, 501 and 502 Indian Penal Code on the allegations that the pamphlet contains imputations concerning the complainant which are absolutely baseless and false and have been made without any justification or lawful excuse with full knowledge that they are false and with intention to harm the reputation of the complainant.

( 2 ) THE petitioner s defence, as stated before me by his counsel, is one of justification under the First, Second and Ninth Exceptions in section 499 Indian Penal Code.

( 3 ) THE case, though instituted in early April last year has not even reached the stage of charge uptil now as the complainant whose examination-in-chief was concluded in two hearings on 18-5-1968 and 7-6-1968 is still under cross-examination since that day. Since then there have been several hearings and the cross-examination which according to the record already fills about 85 typed page s is stitll to go a long way betore it can be said to have been concluded.

( 4 ) AN examination of the record shows that the petitioner alone is not to blame for this long delay in completing the cross-examination. A part of the responsibility for this delay must also be shared by the complainant as on numerous occasions the progress of the cross-examination appears to have been held up by constant interruptions and objections from his counsel. But the major portion of the blame must be borne by the petitioner. As I shall presently show, at several places the cross-examination is apparently directed to matters which have not the remotest connection with the matters in issue in this case. A number of questions would appear to have-no more connection with the case than what the journey of American Astronauts to the moon might have with the political situation in Czechoslovakia or India. And yet pages and pages of the record seem to be filled with such questions.

( 5 ) IT is no doubt true that in a case like this where the accused s defence is truth of the libellous matter, good faith and public interest the range of cross-examination is much wider than in an ordinary case. But the rules regarding relevancy are the same in all cases and a line has to be drawn somewhere. It is also true that in a case of libel, the antecedents, character, habits, associations, veracity and resources of the complainant do come in for consideration and cross-examination may justifiably be directed to ascertain such facts; but the attention at all times has to be focussed on the defence pleaded by the accused. If the facts which an accused seeks to elicit in cross-examination have only a very remote connection with that defence then the questions directed to that end have to be ruled out.

( 6 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel for the complainant the crossexamination at one stage became so prolix and repetitive that he was forced to draw the attention of the magistrate to the scope of cross-examination at the stage at which the case stood at that time. namely, the stage before charge. Lengthy arguments were thereupon addressed before the magistrate on the right of the accused to cross-examine the complainant and his witnesses under section 252 Criminal Procedure Code. As a result, the magistrate passed an order dated 6-9-1969 whereby it was directed that the cross- examination of the complainant should be completed by the accused in the course of the next three hearings of the case for two hours each.

( 7 ) THE present revision has been filed by the accused who as I have already said is the petitioner before me. against that order. His grievance is that he has a statutory right to cross-examine the complainant and his right cannot be curtailed by imposing an arbitrary limitation as to time on the exercise of his rig

Click Here to Read the rest of this document