The court held that the agreed rent of Rs. 53.12 np. per month was reasonable and that the trial court erred in rejecting the estimate of the architect in a capricious and arbitrary manner.

( 1 ) THIS is the defendant s revision against th Judgment and decree of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge dated 15th July, 1961 which was ordered in September, 1961, to be heard early but has unfortunately been delayed so long that it is being disposed of only today. Though the matter ralates to the tenancy of the premises in question, luckily the question of eviction is no longer in controversy and I am only concerned with the question of fixation of standard rent.

( 2 ) IT appears that in the ejectment proceedings in the Court of first instance, the defendant raised the plea of standard rent which was fixed by the trial Court at Rs. 12. 00/8. 00 per mensem.

( 3 ) ON appeal, the learned Senior Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the demised shop was rebuilt in 1944 and after rebuilding, the same was let out to the tenant. The agreed rent, it is common case of the parties, was Rs. 53. 12 np. per mensem. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge accepted the unrebutted statement of Ishar Dass rehitest that the cost of construction of the shop was Rs. 17,099. 00 and calculating 7 per cent of this amount to bers. 975. 00,held the monthly rent on the cost as deposed by Isher Dass to be Rs. 82. 15 np. per mensem. In view of the calculation, the lerned Senior Subordinate Judge observed that the agreed rent of Rs. 53,12 np. per measern could not bs considered to be anrearonable. .

( 4 ) NOW, if that be so and on the figures fust mentioned this conclusion is not contested then the present case would not attract the provision of section 8 (l) (b) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act of 1952 so as to Justify fixation of standard rent. This decision would indsedseemto conclude the matter so far as this revision is concerned, but the learned counsel for the petitioner has very eloquently argued that the conclusion of the lower Aprellate Courl that the cost of the con struction as given by Ishar Dass should be accepted is not in accordance with law, and for this purpose he has tried to take me through the evidence. of the Architect,i am a raid re-assessment or re-valution of evidence is not within the scope of a revision even under section 35 of afort said Act. However, wide the revisional Jurisdiction of this Count under this provision as observed by the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar v, Rao Girdhari Lal Chowbary^,it does not create a right to have the case Teheard, which means that there is no right of appeal on facts to this Court in the garb of the garb of revision. It has further been clarined in the reported case that the phrase "according to law" appearing in section 35 refers to the decision as a whole and it is not proper to quate this expression with errors of law or of fact simpliciter. In so far as errors of fact are concerned, there has never been any controversy that such errors cannot ordinarily be corrected by this Court on revision unless the errors be such as t0 bring the infirmity within the expression "not according to law", But the Supreme Court seems to go a step Inrter and say that even an ordinary error of law may not always be open to collection on revision. If I may so put it, it really amounts to savin that unless there is in adition to an error of law. manifest injustice resulting therefrom, the overall decision may not Jail within the expression "not in accordance with law". On the facts and circumslarcts of the present case, I am. far from satisfied that the impugned decision is not according to law or has resulted in substantial or manifest injustice to the tenant. .

( 5 ) THE lerned counsel tried to make oat a legal infirmity on the basis of thc. argumient that the estimate prepared by ishar Dass was not incloded in the list of rdiance produced by the plaintiffs. This Cliticism was. correctly met by the lower Appellate Court when it laid that the plea of fixation of standard rent was raised by the tenant in reply to the application for ejectment. etc. by the plaintiffs and it was pursua