The inherent powers of the court under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked to reverse an earlier order on the sole ground that it was later found to be erroneous on the merits.

( 1 ) THIS revision has been presented in this Court under section 115, Civil P. C. , and Article 227 of the Constitution of India and is directed against the order of a learned Sabordinate judge Class dated 2ndmay 1961, declining to review under section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, its earlier order dated 7th February, 1959 passed in Execution case No. 357 of 1957 (Municipal Com- mittee Delhi v. Sunni Majlis Aukaj etc )

( 2 ) THE Municipal Corporation Delhi, it appears, had obtained a decree against Sunni Majlis Aukaf and Bhagwan Dass for possession of the suit property subject to the condition that the execution of the decree would be taken out alter the expiry of two years from its date This decree was a compromise decree based on a joint statement of the parties made at the trial on 18th May, 1953. The mesne profits were to be fixed after the inspection of the property by the Court and it was actually fixed at the rate of Rs. 20. 00 per month pending the recovery of possession. Possession, I am informed, was actually delivered on 30th April, 1957. Execution of the decree in regard to the mesne profits was sought, but the same was dismissed by Shri C D. Vashistha, Subordinate Judge II Class, Delhi on 7th February, 1959. It was observed by the executing Court that the execution petition could not be made unless a final decree was passed as provided by Order XX, Rule 12 (2), Code of Civil Produre. In the view of the executing Court, in the case in hand, the Court trying the suit had only laid down the mode of calculation of mesne profits and no definite sum was ascertained. Unless, therefore, a final decree was passed, the decree sought to be executed was inexecutable according to law at that stage because the executing Court could not calculate the amount. A final decree, according to the executing Court, had to be passed by the Court disposing of the suit. The concluding portion of the order was in the following words : -

"in view of the reasons above mentioned, I hold that the mesne profits as claimed by the decree holder cannot be recovered in this execution application. Bat, there is no bar with respect to the recovery of costs. Hence, the costs be recovered from the J. D. according to law. "

( 3 ) FOR reasons best known to the Municipal Committee, Delhi this order was not appealed from and on 28th March, 1960, an application, out of which this revision arises, was presented under section 151, Civil P. C. . for reviewing the order dated 7th February, 1959. By means of the impugned order dated 22nd May, 1961, the Court below has rejected that application with the observation that the impugned order was appealable and also subject to review under Order XLVII, Civil P. C. , both of which remedies were subject to a period of limitation prescribed by statute. In face of these remedies, the Court felt helpless and declined to exercise its inherent power under section 151 of the Code.

( 4 ) ON revision before me, the learned counsel for the petitioner (now the Municipal Corporation of Delhi) Shri S. S. Chadha has very strongly urged that no litigant should suffer by a mistake committed by the Court and, therefore, in the present case, when the Court below has, in the impugned order, held that there was already in existence a decree, it should have reviewed and set aside the earlier order dated 7th February, 1959 and executed the decree made in favour of the petitioner- decree-holder. In support of this submission, he has strongly relied on Rajendra Singh v. Ramganit Singh, S. Dhillu Singh v. S. Sohan Singh and Hasan Vali Bagas v. Isap Bapuji Patet.

( 5 ) I my opinion, none of these decisions lays down any rule of law which can appropriately and justly be applied to the case in hand. It is conceded that the impugned order was appealable. It is also incontrovertible that such appeal is subject to a period of limitation, after the expiry of which the order becomes final. It is not denied that remedy by way of review is prov