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1968 Supreme(Del) 127

High Court Of Delhi
MANDI KULU ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION - Appellant
Versus
JANAK RAJ SINGH - Respondent
vFirst Appeal Order 93 of 1966
Decided On : 09/16/1968

Advocates Appeared:
H.S.Dhir, K.D.SUD, LALIT MOHAN SURI

A bus owner is not liable for damages caused by an accident resulting from a latent defect in the stub axle of the bus, which could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence.

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1939 - SEC. 110-A, 110-B, 110-C - CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION - PLEADING OF FACTS - NECESSITY - ISSUE FRAMING - WRONG ISSUE FRAMED - EFFECT - EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY - LATENT DEFECT IN STUB AXLE - LIABILITY OF BUS OWNER.

Fact of the Case:

Respondent No. 1 and his wife were injured in an accident involving a bus owned by the appellant. They filed applications for compensation under section 110 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, alleging that the accident was caused due to the negligence of the appellant in not maintaining the bus properly.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the only pleading of facts on which the claim for compensation was based was that the vehicle had not been properly checked up before being sent out on the hilly journey. The court also found that the Claims Tribunal had framed a wrong issue, namely, whether the accident was caused by the negligence of the bus driver, which led to the claimants trying to prove the negligence of the driver, even though this was not pleaded by them.

Issues: 1. Whether the appellant was negligent in not maintaining the bus properly? 2. Whether the accident was caused by the negligence of the bus driver?

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the appellant was not negligent in not maintaining the bus properly because the stub axle, which broke and caused the accident, was a latent defect that could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence on the part of the appellant. The court also held that the accident was not caused by the negligence of the bus driver because the evidence showed that the stub axle broke suddenly due to a manufacturing defect.

Final Decision: The court set aside the order of the Claims Tribunal awarding damages to the respondent and allowed the appeal. The court also allowed the petition filed by the appellant against the award of damages to Mrs. Madan, wife of respondent No. 1.

V. S. Deshpande

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against the Older dated 27th August, 1906 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Punjab at Chandigarh, under section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called the Act) awarding damages to the respondent No. 1 against the appellant and respondent No. 2.

( 2 ) THE respondent No. 1 and his wife were passengers in Bus No. 2357 belonging to the appellant and driven by its employee respondent. No. 2. On the 27th June, 1963, the bus was going from Kulu topathankot. The bus was travelling from Kulu to Pathankot when it sufferred an accident in which the respondent No. 1 and his wife were injured. The respondent No. 1 and his wife made two applications for compensation under section 110 A of the Act. These applications were the basis of the claim for compensation made by the respondent No. 1 and his wife. Under the heading "cause of accident with brief description", respondent No. 1 and his wife simply stated as follows :-

"when the bus reached Nagrota at about 2-30 p. m. it struck against a tree and turned on its right side causing serious grievous injuries to the petititioner. This accident was caused due to the negligence of the respondents. The vehicle had not been properly checked up before being sent out on the hilly journey and other acts of emmission and commission were responsible for the said accident. the accident having been caused due to the act, neglect or default of the respondents, they are liable to compensate the petitioner in damages for the injuries sufferred by him". The petitioner then claimed general and special damages. But the important point to note is that the only pleading of facts on which the claim was based was that the vehicle has not been prperly checked u before being ou on the hilly journey. Under section 110-C of the. Act, the claims Tribunal may, subset to any rules that may he made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. The tribunal has been given to powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and for such other purposes as may be prescribed. In actual practice the procedure followed by the Claims Tribunal is analogous to that of a Civil Court. At any rate the broad rules of pleadings apply to every Tribunal following the Rules of Natural Justice. The verv object of describing the cause of accident in the application tor compensation in the prescribed form was to inform the respondent on what grounds the claim for compensation was based. Withhout being so informed, the respondent would not know against what grounds precisely he is to defend himself Secondly the applicant having once taken up a definite ground in the pleading, cannot be allowed to make out a new one in evidence. It was necessary,therefore, for the respondent No. 1 and his wife to state fully the facts on which their claim for compensation was based. On the pleading made by them, their claim was based on the fa:t that the vehicle had not been properly checked up before being sent out on the hilly journey. Their further statement that "fiber acts of comission and commission were responsible for the said accident" was too va"us in as much as no particular act was stated to have been so responsible for the accident. Similarly, their statement that "the accident having been caused due to the act, neglect or default of the respondents, they are liable to compensate the petitioner is also a mere conclusion of law and not a statement of fact at all. There is thus no pleading of negligence on the part of the bus driver, respondent No. 2 at all. The only pleading is of negligence in not maintaining the bus in a fit condition on the part o ( the appellant.

( 3 ) IN the written statement before the Tribunal the appellant and respondent No. 2 pointed out that the accident was not due to any wrongful act or negligence on their part. "the vehicle had









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